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Abstract 
If information is not perfect, theories prescribe a negative relation between in-
formation availability and expected stock returns. Using two readily available vari-
ables, price and volume, I construct a new proxy for information and test its relation 
to returns in the 1964-2007 period on NYSE-listed stocks. I find that information 
revelation predicts lower future returns, controlling for beta, size, book-to-market 
ratio, liquidity, and momentum. A long/short trading strategy based on sorts on 
the information proxy generates alphas of 3% to 4%. These alphas do not have 
to imply an arbitrage opportunity; they are consistent with time-varying expected 
returns in a rational model. 
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1 Introduction 
The notion that stock pnces reflect information is an old one. Ever since Hayek 
(1945) laid forth the idea, it has been tested time and again, in finance as well as in 
accounting. What has been studied less often however, is the relation between information 
and expected stock returns. Early asset-pricing models like the CAPM or the APT 
have assumed a perfect information world, yet, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that 
equilibrium cannot exist in such a world; if information is costly and there are no rewards 
for producing it, then no one would rationally choose to do so. In response, models have 
been extended to incorporate the complexity of the information environment and one 
prediction they all have in common is that expected returns should be decreasing in the 
amount of public information. This is the basic hypothesis I empirically test. 
Information availability can vary across time or across stocks. In this paper I focus 
on the time dimension. The relation between information and the cross-section of stock 
returns is of no less importance but is beyond the scope of this article. Consistent with 
theory, I find that average returns in the months after information revelation are signifi-
cantly lower than before. The average difference in returns for a firm one month before an 
information event and one month after is 0. 7%. The difference monotonically decreases as 
the time window expands, but is still statistically significant up to sixth months. Fixed-
effects regressions using all NYSE stocks during the 1964-2007 period further reveal that 
information revelation in one month can predict stock returns in the next month. This 
finding is robust to different time periods, changes in systematic risk (beta), size, book-
to-market ratio, liquidity, and past returns. Finally, I show that a naive investor could 
have earned annualized returns around 3-4% on a risk-adjusted basis, by short selling 
stocks that have recently revealed information and investing the proceeds in others where 
information is private or has not caught the market attention. 
These "abnormal" returns need not be interpreted as arbitrage opportunities. In a 
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rational setting, these findings can represent a risk-return trade-off. Information revelation 
can reduce uncertainty about the future cash-flows of a firm, hence the discount rate, or 
it can increase the demand for the stock by attracting uninformed investors who were 
previously too cautious or negligent about the firm. In either case, investors bid up the 
price and depress future returns temporarily. Behavioral explanations, such as over /under 
reaction of investors, are also plausible, however I am not aware of any behavioral model 
that specifically predicts the pattern I observe in returns. 
Because the amount of information ( or the asymmetry in the information environment) 
is unobservable, the first hurdle in any empirical study is constructing a reliable proxy 
for information. Many have been proposed in the literature, such as the period of listing 
in Barry and Brown (1984), the PIN measure of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002), 
accruals quality in Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005), and the number of 
news articles in the media by Fang and Peress (2007). While each measure has its own 
merit, one common drawback of all previous measures is that they are only available for 
short time-series - usually much shorter than what it is commonly used in asset-pricing 
tests. To overcome this problem, I propose a new information proxy that is based on two 
most readily available variables: price and volume. Specifically, the proxy is the monthly 
estimate of the daily correlation between absolute returns and dollar volume. Empirical 
evidence shows that information revelation elicits a simultaneous response in price and 
volume. Hence, I expect these variables to move together more closely in months when 
information arrives, than in other months. 
The idea to back out the existence of information from price and volume reactions is 
based on Beaver (1968). He defines information content as any change in investors' ex-
pectations and motivates the use of price and volume by noting that price change implies 
a change in the expectations of the market as a whole, and volume implies a change in 
the expectations of the individual investors. On the day of the earnings announcement he 
observes abnormal movement in both these variables, and thus concludes that information 
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must be revealed. Because magnitude of the price change is closely linked to the stock's 
total risk, and trading volume is often a proxy for liquidity, I fold these two variables into 
one, to avoid collinearity with other control variables in the regressions. The correlation 
between price change and volume turns out to be orthogonal to both systematic and idio-
syncratic risk, and liquidity, and at the same time, behaves similarly to price change or 
volume taken separately around earnings announcements. On top of tractability, this cor-
relation measure has the added benefit of capturing the importance of information, since 
information events are inferred from market reactions (rather than newspaper articles, for 
example). 
More recent evidence on price and volume reactions to earnings announcements and 
their informativeness can be found in Landsman and Maydew (2002). Earnings announce-
ments though, are not the only type of information events that price and volume react to. 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) find that the number of Dow Jones Newswires announce-
ments are directly related to trading volume and returns. The same phenomena is also 
observed in the bond market; Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) show that both volatil-
ity and trading volume of Treasuries increase around macroeconomic announcements. 
Tauchen and Pitts (1983) develop a theoretical model to explain the relation between 
price changes and volume 1 . They derive the covariance between price increments and 
volume as a function of the variability in the number of news arrivals. According to their 
model, information arriving all at once, as opposed to smoothly flowing to the market, 
induces a higher correlation between price and volume. If the model is correct, the months 
where I observe high correlation should correspond to important and unexpected news 
events 2 . 
1 Price/Volume relations have a long history. See Karpoff (1987) for a review. 
2 However months of low observed correlation are not guaranteed to be low in information. In the 
Tauchen and Pitts (1983) model, a company that reveals no information and a company that reveals 
a constant stream of information generates a low price/volume correlation. This potential bias though, 
would make it more difficult to find statistically significant differences in returns between high and low 
information months because some of the low information months would be "contaminated" with steady 
high information. 
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The results in this paper are consistent with rational asset-pricing theories that relax 
the assumption of all market participants having perfect and symmetric information. 
There are various approaches to this problem. Klein and Bawa (1976) and Klein and 
Bawa (1977) consider portfolio choice with differing amounts of parameter uncertainty. 
The intuition behind their model is that as the number of observations grows parameters 
can be estimated more precisely, which reduces risk and the increases the allocation of 
the risky asset. Building on this idea, Barry and Brown (1985) show that when firms face 
differential amounts of parameter uncertainty, CAPM betas will be lower than the true 
betas for low information securities and higher than the true betas for high information 
securities. In Merton (1987) 's incomplete information model investors agree on parameter 
values - there is no parameter uncertainty - however not every investor knows about 
every firm. Thus, firms with more visibility attract more demand from the investor pool 
and can sustain a lower rate of return in equilibrium. In Easley and O'Hara (2004), 
every investor knows about every firm, but they do not all share the same information. 
Uninformed investors know that they are uninformed though, and are aware of their 
disadvantage in trading with the informed. This raises the risk premium on firms where 
information is more private. Accounting literature has also offered some new insights in 
this area. Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) show that the CAPM can be modified 
to formalize the notion of information risk and forward-looking betas can potentially 
subsume information risk. 
Empirical tests of these models do not always agree. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara 
(2002) report evidence of information risk premium using the "probability of information-
based trading" (PIN) measure derived from intraday trading data, but Duarte and Young 
(2009) argue that PIN is priced because of liquidity, not information. Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson, and Schipper (2005) and Core, Guay, and Verdi (2007) both use accruals quality as 
the proxy for information risk, but come to opposite conclusions on whether information 
risk is priced. Small samples biases may be one reason for these conflicting findings. I 
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contribute to this literature by utilizing a much larger dataset which not only makes the 
results more generalizable, but also facilitates easier comparisons with classic empirical 
asset-pricing studies. I believe this is also the first paper to document the time-series 
relation between information availability and stock returns. 
Finally, this paper is also related to the strand of literature that studies how media 
coverage affects asset prices. Chan (2003) and Vega (2006) investigate price movements 
following news events but their focus is on momentum anomalies, not expected returns. 
Both Tetlock (2007), and Tetlock (2008) study the content of media articles and find that 
media pessimism can predict lower stock prices in the future, both in aggregate and in 
individual stocks. Fang and Peress (2007) test the Merton (1987) model directly by using 
the number of news articles about a company as a proxy for "investor recognition". They 
find that in the cross-section, stocks with no media coverage earn higher returns than 
stocks with high media coverage. 
2 Data and Methodology 
The two main variables in my study are stock returns and trading volume, at both 
daily and monthly frequency, which I obtain from CRSP. Balance sheet information re-
quired to calculate book-to-market ratios, and earnings announcement dates are from the 
annual and quarterly files in COMPUSTAT. Merger announcement dates are obtained 
from SDC. Fama-French factors, the momentum factor, Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity se-
ries and Sadka liquidity series are available on WRDS. 
My methodology involves two steps: first I construct the information proxy, RHO, 
by estimating the daily correlation between absolute returns and dollar volume for every 
stock in every month, second I run a regression of monthly stock returns on these estimates 
of RHO next to other firm characteristics as controls. To make sure that RHO captures 
firm-specific information, I filter out the market-wide movements in returns and volume 
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where rid is the return of stock i on day d, Vid is the dollar volume of stock i on day d, 
RMd is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day d, V Md is the mean dollar 
market volume on day d, and Eid and Eid are the residuals from the estimated model. RHO 
is PABSE,VOLE· 
I use the following filters to construct my dataset: 
• I drop the first month a stock appears on the CRSP tapes to minimize the effects of 
IPOs. The reason is that the information environment surrounding IPOs might not 
be representative of the market's workings in general. I keep the last month's return 
to avoid survivorship bias. I also adjust delisting returns as in Shumway (1997). 
• To improve the accuracy of the estimates, I require at least 125 observations for 
yearly variables, and 15 for monthly variables. 
• I restrict myself to only common stock (CRSP codes 10 and 11) on the NYSE. This 
is because volume has a different interpretation on NASDAQ and has generally been 
excluded in previous studies on volume. 
• I exclude stocks whose end of month prices were less than $5 and greater than $1000. 
• To make sure the results are not driven by the outliers, I drop the 1st and the 99th 
percentiles in my correlation estimates each month. 
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The resulting dataset has 3342 unique firms over 526 months and there is a total of 
578,564 firm-month observations. 
3 Results 
3.1 RHO around Known Information Events 
Because my results on stock returns depend on the validity of RHO as an information 
proxy, I start by investigating RHO around known information events. Undoubtedly, one 
of the most important information events for investors is the earnings announcement, 
and there is a large literature on its information content. Merger announcements also 
make the headlines in media and elicit a strong reaction from the market, which speaks 
to their information content. In Figure 1 and Table 1, I replicate some of the previous 
findings in Beaver (1968) and Morse (1981) on earnings announcements (albeit with a 
much larger dataset), and extend it to merger announcements. The graphs in Panel A 
and B of Figure 1 display a significant spike in both absolute returns and volume on the 
day of the earnings announcement and the merger announcement. The information proxy, 
RHO, also appears to be much higher in the month of the announcement. Table 1 reports 
the statistics used to generate these graphs. Average RHO in an earnings announcement 
month is 0.30; compared with the previous month's average of 0.27 and the subsequent 
month's 0.26, the differences are statistically significant with t-statistics of 45. 78 and 
54.35, respectively. On merger announcement months, the differences in RHO before and 
after are even larger in magnitude, and still statistically significant. The before-and-after 
differences in absolute returns and volume are presented in both Panels as benchmarks. 
The t-statistics for RHO highly resemble t-statistics for absolute returns and volume. 
Figure 1 here 
Table 1 here 
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The differences reported in Table 1 are likely to be conservative. There could be other 
information events in the months prior or subsequent to the earnings announcement. 
RHO being a monthly estimate, also attenuates the impact of a single day of information 
arrival. This downward bias though, would make it less likely to find significant results 
in the return regressions later on. 
3.2 RHO and Returns: Event Study Approach 
In this section, I frame my tests similar to an event study. This way, the economic 
significance of RHO is cast in units of return. I define an information event as RHO 
being above its 90th. percentile value for each individual firm. For comparison, I also 
include results that use absolute returns or volume as the proxy for information. In Table 
2 Panel A, the difference in average returns one month before and after the information 
event (proxied by RHO) is about 0. 7% which is statistically significant with at-statistic of 
11.30. Comparing two months before and two months after reveals a difference of about 
0.5%. As we compare periods further out, the differences tend to decrease monotonically, 
yet still are statistically significant. Because the comparisons are within a firm, not 
between firms, it is unlikely that the differences are due to systematic risk. 
Table 2 here 
In Panels B and C, I run the same tests with absolute returns and volume separately. 
While these results also come out statistically significant, the signs differ for the two 
variables. If absolute return is used as a proxy for information, then returns in the 
months before information arrival seems to be lower than in the months after. If volume 
is used as a proxy for information, we get the exact opposite result. This indicates that 
on their own, these variables may be unreliable proxies of information. 
Figure 2 here 
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Figure 2 uses RHO as the proxy for information (as every other test for the rest of the 
paper), and an information event is again defined as RHO being above its 90th percentile 
value for a given stock. The x-axis represents event time where zero is the month of 
the information event, and y-axis represents the cross-sectional averages of stock returns. 
Our concern is not with the spikes that appear on event months. We are interested in the 
returns before and after the event. In Panel A, we can visually note the pattern of returns 
increasing prior to the event month, then sharply dropping off and gradually rising again. 
This graph is the visual representation of the statistics presented in Table 2 Panel A. 
Both the statistics and the plot imply an increase in expected returns before information 
revelation and a decrease right after. A possible explanation of this phenomena is, if 
investors have a preference for stocks which they have recently been informed about 
(because they now pose less uncertainty), they will buy them up, increasing prices and 
depressing returns. Conversely, the stocks that have not revealed information in a long 
time will need to compensate investors with higher expected returns to induce them into 
buying them. The pattern is also consistent with the view that stocks in which trading is 
based more on private information should offer an "information risk" premium. Assuming 
that the top 10th percentiles of RHO represent some public news events, higher returns 
before information becomes public could be compensation for the uninformed investors 
to trade with the informed. 
In Panels B, C, and D, I provide more detail on these return differences. In Panel B 
I drop the months in which earnings announcements were made. If the information in 
earnings leaked to the market before the announcement, this could be a reason for the 
rising pattern in returns. I observe the same pattern without the earnings announcements, 
meaning that the differences are not driven strictly by scheduled new events. In Panel C, 
a "bad" news event is defined by both a negative return and a RHO estimate above its 
90th percentile value. Similarly, 11 good II news is defined by a positive return and a RHO 
falling above its 90th percentile mark. In both cases, the returns are always lower after 
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information arrives, be it good or bad. The differences are still statistically significant, 
but are not reported here to save space. This result allows me to rule out a few more 
alternative explanations. If the return pattern based on RHO reflected the post-earnings-
announcement-drift, the returns would not be lower after positive news. More generally, 
lower returns after a month of "good II news, does not support the common behavioral 
argument that investors are slow to react to news. 
3.3 RHO and Returns: Fixed-effects Regression 
Having demonstrated the relation between information and returns in event time, I 
now turn to calender time. The event study methodology of the previous section assumes 
firm characteristics to be constant over time and no dependence among firms at a point 
in time. I can now relax these assumptions with a two-way fixed-effects regression. The 
regression approach also allows me to make full use the variation in RHO, as opposed to 
limiting myself to extreme values. The model is: 
K 
r1t = 1::)kxki,t-l + ai +It+ Eit 
k=l 
(4) 
where r1t is the return of stock i in month t, Xki,t-l is characteristic k of stock i in the 
previous month or year ( depending on whether the characteristic is updated on a monthly 
or yearly basis), bk is the estimate of the coefficient of characteristic k, ai is the firm fixed 
effect and it is the time fixed effect. Eit are the residuals. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. 
Because it is unrealistic to assume that the firm effect is "fixed" for a span of forty 
years, I divide up the dataset into four decades and fit the model separately. The four 
panels in Table 3 reports the estimates in these time periods. All regressors are lagged 
so that they are in the investors' information set. The coefficient on RHO therefore 
represents the effect of information revelation in a given month on next month's return. I 
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find that the coefficient is significant in all periods and robust to the inclusion of various 
controls. In particular, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is derived from the same 
exact variables as RHO - absolute returns and dollar volume - and therefore one might 
expect them to be closely related. Yet, its inclusion in the regression seems to have 
no effect on the coefficient of RHO. In a similar fashion, I find the inclusion of past 
returns to have no effect on the coefficient of RHO. The same is true when dividend yield 
and idiosyncratic risk are added to the regression. RHO appears to be orthogonal to 
all these factors that have been shown to affect stock returns. The negative coefficient 
indicates that returns following informationally rich months are lower than average. The 
relationship is strongest in the 1975-1985 period and weakest in the most recent period. 
These differences among time periods could just be a feature of the data or they could be 
related to some structural changes in the information environment. 
Table 3 here 
3.4 Portfolios sorted on RHO 
While regressions in the previous section established the statistical significance of 
RHO, they do not tell us much about the economic significance of this empirical regu-
larity. In this section I use a common portfolio benchmarking approach to illustrate the 
significance of information in units of return. I first sort stocks on a monthly basis by 
RHO, the information proxy, and form decile portfolios. Then I regress the time-series 
returns of these portfolios onto the Fama-French three-factors, the momentum factor, 
and the liquidity factor. The intercept from this regression, alpha, is the risk-adjusted, 
11 abnormal II return. The regression model is: 
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where Rpm is the excess return of portfolio pin month m, M KT, SM B, HM L are the 
three factors Fama and French (1996), UM Dis the momentum factor, and LIQv is the 
value weighted traded factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). ap is the abnormal or 
risk-adjusted return of portfolio p. 
The results are presented in Table 4. The last column, 1-10, refers to the long/short 
portfolio (low RHO stocks minus high RHO stocks). The null hypothesis is that alpha 
should be zero, because it is zero-net-investment by construction and risk is accounted 
for by the systematic factors. All the alphas in the equal-weighted portfolios are statisti-
cally significant, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis. The equal-weighted portfolios 
are pure bets on RHO - they do not invest more in larger stocks - and thus the infor-
mation effect is observed more precisely here than in the value-weighted versions. An 
equal-weighted portfolio long in low RHO stocks and short in high RHO stocks generates 
CAPM or Fama-French three-factor alphas around 3%, annualized. Adding momentum 
and liquidity factors to the mix does not reduce the alphas at all; in fact, alpha increases 
to about 4 % per year. 
Table 4 here 
The value-weighted portfolios do not exhibit significant alphas. Since value-weighting 
overweights large stocks, the loss of significance implies that size and information may be 
related. This also makes economic sense. For large, more visible firms, information may 
be more public and the premium for "information risk" may be smaller. It could also 
be that information is more costly to produce for small firms, and therefore the rewards 
are higher. In Table 5, I do a double-sort; first on size, then on RHO. Rows indicate the 
size quintiles and columns indicate the RHO quintiles. For brevity, I only report five-
factor alphas (results are qualitatively similar with other alphas). With the double-sorted 
portfolios, we can see that there is indeed a relation between information and size. Both 
the equal-weighted and the value-weighted spread portfolios in the first two size quintiles, 
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the smallest stocks, have significant alphas. The magnitudes are also larger, close to 7% 
annualized. The premium for information appears to be strongest among smaller stocks 
consistent with our expectations. 
Table 5 here 
3.5 Robustness 
3.5.1 Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
Most asset-pricing tests utilize the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method due to its 
intuitive nature and ability to handle time-varying risk characteristics. To make my results 
more easily comparable with previous studies I also run a Fama-MacBeth regression in 
this section. With this method I can estimate the model for the full time period, which 
was not be appropriate with the fixed-effects model. Specifically, the regression I run is: 
K 
rit =at+ ~bktxki,t-1 + Eit 
k=l 
(6) 
where rit is the return of stock i in month t, Xki,t-l is characteristic k of stock i in 
the previous month or year ( depending on whether the characteristic is updated on a 
monthly or yearly basis), bkt is the estimate of the coefficient of characteristic k in month 
t, and Eit are the residuals. This regression is run every month from 1964 to 2007 and the 
time-average of the coefficients are reported. 
Table 6 here 
Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates from this regression. In column 1, the co-
efficient of RHO comes in highly significant with a t-statistic of -5.599. The coefficients 
of the other variables agree with previous studies (Fama and French (1992)3) in that size 
3The fact that beta is significant in some of the specifications, as opposed to "flat", may come as a 
surprise. It is likely to be the result of higher variation in the first stage beta estimates. Unlike Fama 
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is negatively related (t = -6.773), and book-to-market is positively related (t = 3.037) 
to returns. Next, I add in the constituents of RHO, absolute return and dollar volume, 
separately to illustrate that it is not the individual movements in these two variables that 
drive the returns. Furthermore, even when RHO is taken out of the regression, absolute 
return and volume show no predictive power for returns over the next month. 
Columns 5 and 6 add the controls for liquidity. While liquidity variables are signif-
icant on their own, they have no effect on RHO. If anything, the significance of RHO 
slightly increases with their inclusion. Moving onto columns 7 and 8, I find consistent 
results with the previous studies that have shown past returns to have predictive power 
for future returns. The coefficient on RHO is even more significant in these specifica-
tions. These results imply that the information effect is quite distinct from momentum 
or liquidity. Controls for dividend yield and idiosyncratic risk seem to have no effect on 
RHO either, and taking RHO out of the regression leaves other coefficients practically the 
same. These results suggest that the information effect must be orthogonal to all these 
other characteristics that have been used previously to characterize the cross-section of 
returns. 
3.5.2 Systematic Liquidity 
Even though the both the fixed-effects and the Fama-MacBeth regressions controlled 
for liquidity, those liquidity variables were designed to relate the level of liquidity of a 
stock to its return. Studies like Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) show that 
there is commonality in liquidity and variations in market-wide liquidity may be priced. 
Following this line of thought, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) construct a market-wide 
liquidity measure from firm level daily data, and go on to show that liquidity betas - the 
sensitivity of a stock's return to aggregate liquidity - are priced. Another similar approach 
and French (1992) who use portfolio betas, I estimate beta at the firm level using daily data and update 
it every month. 
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is by Sadka (2006). He decomposes aggregate liquidity into two components, temporary 
fixed and permanent variable, which capture market making costs and informational trad-
ing, respectively. In this section, I control for these systematic liquidity factors, or more 
specifically, the stocks' return sensitivity to market-wide liquidity shocks. In Table 7, I 
show results similar to the regressions in the previous section using the Fama-MacBeth 
method, but this time with systematic liquidity betas. BETALIQ is the systematic liq-
uidity measure of Pastor and Stambaugh in Panel A, or Sadka in Panels B and C. RHO 
keeps its significance in the presence of the liquidity betas and liquidity betas are not 
significant on their own4 . The reduction in the significance of RHO in Panels B and C 
is mostly due to the shorter time period (Sadka liquidity series are only available after 
1988). Finally, using the stock's size and book-to-market factor beta, as opposed to using 
size and book-to-market ratio directly, do not affect the results in any way. In conclusion, 
RHO does not appear to be related to systematic liquidity. 
Table 7 here 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper I investigate the effects of information revelation on stock returns. 
Several theoretical models postulate information risk to be priced, or more generally, 
information revelation to have pricing implications since information reduces uncertainty. 
I contribute to the empirical literature in this area by developing a new information proxy 
and demonstrating its relation to expected returns in the over time. I find that returns 
following high information months tend to be lower, returns following low information 
months tend to be higher. Moreover, this information effect is not captured by, or itself 
4The lack of significance of the liquidity betas do not refute the results of these previous studies 
mentioned. Both Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006) have used portfolios to reduce the 
noise in their estimation and note that at the individual stock level, liquidity betas may not be very 
useful in explaining the cross-section of returns. 
16 
captures, other factors previously shown to be related to returns (e.g., size, book-to-
market, beta). Liquidity and momentum also appear to be orthogonal to the information 
proxy variable. 
The results are both statistically and economically significant. A net-zero-investment 
portfolio constructed to exploit the difference between informationally rich and poor 
stocks, generates risk-adjusted returns of approximately 3-4%, depending on the factors 
used to adjust for risk. I find that alphas are even higher among smaller stocks ( up to 
7% per year), where information production would be more costly. These numbers, in all 
likelihood, underestimate the true information premium. The portfolios use only stocks 
from the NYSE, known to have one of the most strict listing requirements in the world, 
and hence is more likely to be informationally efficient. 
These II abnormal II returns are consistent with rational models that predict a negative 
relation between information and expected returns; they need not imply market ineffi-
ciency. As Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) points out, this premium might be necessary to 
compensate traders for their information production efforts. The same results could also 
be explained by behavioral arguments. Further research could try to answer the question 
of whether these abnormal returns are borne out of time-varying expected returns or the 
over /under reactions of traders. 
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A Appendix 
A.1 Variable definitions 
BETA, RMSEDAY: These two variables are controls for systematic and unsystematic risk 
in the CAPM framework. I estimate the beta of each stock by regressing its daily return 
on the CRSP value-weighted index on a yearly basis. The regression I run is: 
(7) 
where ridy is the return of stock ion day din year y, RMdy is the return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index on day din year y, and /3iy is the estimate of BETA, the systematic 
risk, for stock i in year y. RMSEDAY is the estimate of the Jvar(Eidy)from this regression 
and is the measure of idiosyncratic risk. 
LNSIZE: This is the log of market capitalization of a stock at the end of the year. 
LNBTM: This is the log of the book-to-market ratio. Book values are calculated similar 
to Fama and French (1996): book value is the annual COMPUSTAT item stockholders' 
equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred 
stock. I use redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) for the book value of 
preferred stock. Book values with negative or zero values are omitted and they lagged for 
six months after the fiscal year end date which is generally considered enough time for 
financial statements to be released. Book-to-market ratios are then calculated as book 
value divided by the market value of equity at the end of the year. 
ABSRET: This is the absolute value of the monthly market-adjusted return. Market-
adjustment entails regressing monthly returns on the market index for the previous 60-
month period and using the beta estimates to calculate the residuals each month. 
VOLD: "Firm-specific" dollar volume. Dollar volume for each firm is regressed on 
the mean market dollar volume for the previous 60-month period, and betas from that 
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regression is used to calculate the monthly residuals. 
RHO: The correlation between absolute returns and volume. Absolute returns and vol-
ume are market-adjusted before their correlation is estimated. The following regressions 
use a 250 trading day window and are rolled over every month. 
(8) 
(9) 
where rid is the return of stock i on day d, Vid is the dollar volume of stock i on day 
d, RMd is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day d, and V Md is the mean 
dollar market volume on day d. Eid and Eid are the actual residuals from the estimated 
model. RHO is Pim• the estimated correlation coefficient between the absolute value of 
the residual return and the residual dollar volume for stock i in month m 
ILLIQ: This is Amihud's liquidity measure. Amihud (2002) shows that stocks that 
score higher on this measure earn higher returns and interprets this as the illiquidity 
premium. It is defined as the yearly average ratio of absolute returns to dollar volume. 
The exact formula is: 
(11) 
where Riyd and VOLDiyd are, respectively, the return and dollar volume for stock i 
on day din year y. Diy is the number of observation days in month in year y. 
TRNOVDY: Daily number of shares traded is divided by the number of shares out-
standing, then averaged over a year. This is similar in construction to the turnover 
measure of Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) who show that stocks with lower turnover 
exhibit higher returns. 
RLAG13 8, RLAG7 2: Past returns have been shown to affect the cross section 
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of returns by Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). These variables are the geometric averages of the cumulative monthly returns in 
the last 6 months, and second to last 6 months, respectively. They are lagged for one 
extra month to avoid problems with bid-ask bounce or thin trading. 
DIVYLD: The sum of all periodic dividends ( quarterly, annual, etc ... ) paid in a year 
divided by the year-end price. Special or extra dividends are excluded. If a stock does 
not pay dividends it is still kept in the sample with a dividend yield of zero. 
BETALIQ, BETAMKT, BETASIZE, BETABTM, RMSEMON: BETALIQ is either 
the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity beta as described in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), or 
one of the Sadka liquidity betas (Transitory Fixed and Permanent Variable) described in 
Sadka (2006). The other betas are the factor sensitivities to the Fama and French (1996) 
factors. They are estimated in one multivariate time-series regression: 
where rim is the return of stock ion month m, Lm is the market-wide liquidity measure 
of Pastor and Stambaugh, or Sadka. ;3f is the liquidity beta (BETALIQ) of stock i, and 
M KT, SM B, HM L are the Fama-French factors. RMSEMON is the estimate of the 
J var( Eim)from this regression and serves as an alternative measure of idiosyncratic risk. 
In addition to the filters described in the previous section, I require a stock to have at 
least five years of consecutive return data to estimate its liquidity beta. This 60 month 
regression is rolled over every month. 
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TABLE 1: PRICE CHANGES AND TRADING VOLUME AROUND KNOWN INFORMATION EVENTS 
RHO is the monthly estimate of the daily correlation between the absolute returns and dollar trading volume of a stock. ABSRET and 
VOLD are the residuals calculated from the estimated parameters of a pre-sample 60 month regression of absolute retuns and dollar volume on 
their market counterparts. The residuals are then divided by their corresponding estimated standard deviations to achieve cross-firm comparability. 
Tables report the cross-sectional means of these variables calculated in the before and after months of the information event. Month of the event is 
taken as the base month (t=0), against which mean comparison tests are performed and t-statistics reported. In Panel A the information event is 
the earnings announcement, in Panel B, the merger announcement for a target. 
Panel A: Earnings Announcements 
Difference 
Time to event Difference 
RHO1 
(RHO 1 -RHO 0) 
I-stat ABSRET 1 (ABSRET 1 - t-stat (months) 
ABSRETo) 
Difference 
VOLD, (VOLD 1 - I-stat 
VOLD 0) 
-2 0.268 -0.036 45.82 0.768 -0.102 37.41 0.130 -0.115 14.97 
-1 0.268 -0.036 45.78 0.785 -0.085 30.80 0.065 -0.180 23.56 
0 0.303 0.000 0.00 0.870 0.000 0.00 0.245 0.000 0.00 
1 0.261 -0.042 54.35 0.761 -0.110 40.14 0.131 -0.113 14.36 
2 0.271 -0.032 41.37 0.794 -0.077 27.36 0.123 -0.122 15.22 
Panel B: Merger Announcements 
Difference 
Time to event Difference 
RHO1 
(RHO 1-RHO 0) 
I-stat ABSRET 1 (ABSRET 1- I-stat (months) 
ABSRET 0) 
Difference 
VOLD 1 (VOLD 1- I-stat 
VOLD 0) 
-2 0.295 -0.088 19.78 0.821 -0.402 18.16 0.232 -1.934 19.94 
-1 0.305 -0.078 17.24 0.901 -0.322 13.88 0.449 -1.717 16.72 
0 0.383 0.000 0.00 1.223 0.000 0.00 2.166 0.000 0.00 
0.268 -0.115 25.47 0.763 -0.460 21.12 0.542 -1.624 16.17 
2 0.274 -0.109 23.78 0.793 -0.430 19.50 0.128 -2.038 21.00 
TABLE 2: AVERAGE RETURNS OF STOCKS BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION REVELATION 
A month in which information has been revealed (t=0) is defined as the information proxy variable 
being above its 90th percentile value for the life of a stock. Returns for that stock in the previous and 
subsequent six months, along with their respective differences are then averaged cross-sectionally in event 
time. The t-statistic tests whether the cross-sectional means of these differences are equal to zero. In Panel 
A the information proxy is RHO, the correlation between (market-adjusted) absolute returns and dollar 
volume. In Panel B the information proxy is ABSRET, the monthly absolute return, and in Panel C the 
information proxy is VOLD, the monthly dollar volume. 




























0.0173 0.0097 0.0072 
0.0153 0.0103 0.0047 
0.0158 0.0113 0.0044 
0.0139 0.0108 0.0020 
0.0131 0.0111 0.0016 
0.0139 0.0130 0.0017 




0.0005 0.0073 -0.0058 
0.0024 0.0079 -0.0054 
0.0041 0.0102 -0.0049 
0.0074 0.0106 -0.0027 
0.0076 0.0111 -0.0042 
0.0093 0.0105 -0.0036 




0.0245 -0.0088 0.0227 
0.0205 -0.0070 0.0236 
0.0199 -0.0050 0.0220 
0.0168 -0.0018 0.0191 
0.0190 -0.0018 0.0185 






















TABLE 3: FIXED-EFFECTS REGRESSIONS OF STOCK RETURNS ON RHO AND OTHER STOCK CHARACTER-
ISTICS 
In addition to the variables reported in this table all regressions include month dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. BETA is CAPM's measure of systematic risk, estimated at a yearly 
frequency using daily returns. LNSIZE is the log of market value of equity on the last day of the year prior 
to the year returns are measured. LNBTM is the log of book-to-market ratio, calculated as the ratio of the 
book value of equity to the market value of equity on the last day of the year prior to the year returns are 
measured. RHO is the proxy for information revelation and is defined as the monthly estimate of the daily 
correlation between (market-adjusted) absolute returns and dollar volume. ABSRET is the firm-specific 
monthly absolute return and similarly, VOLD is the firm-specific monthly dollar volume. ILLIQ is Amihud's 
liquidity measure, which is defined as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute returns to dollar volume. 
TRNOVDY is the yearly average of daily turnover. RLAG7-2 and RLAG13-8 are geometric averages 
of lagged returns in the previous 6 months and the 6 months before that, respectively. DIVYLD is the 
yearly sum of ordinary cash dividends divided by the price (both adjusted for splits) at the end of the 
year. RMSEDAY is the estimated volatility of the residuals from the BETA regression. BETA, ILLIQ, 
TRNOVDY, DIVYLD, and RMSEDAY are lagged for one year. RHO, ABSRET and VOLD are lagged for 
one month. 
Panel A: 1964-1974 Panel B: 1975-1985 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BETA -0.187 -0.308 -0.014 -0.011 -0.040 -0.111 -0.412 -0.265 -0.267 -0.289 -0.243 -0.083 
(-2.04) .. (-2.34) .. (-0.16) (-0.13) (-0.41) (-0.74) (-4.27)"' (-2.43)" (-2.76) ... (-2.87)-- (-2.26)" (-0.69) 
LNSIZE -3.182 -3.739 -2.914 -2.892 -2.917 -3.893 -2.590 -2.519 -2.478 -2.622 -2.655 -2.746 
(-25.01)' .. (-18.17)-· (-22.52)-· (-21.64)' .. (-20.49)'- (-16.92)' .. (-20.06)-· (-16.41)' .. (-18.77)'- (-18.97)' .. (-19.36)' .. (-16.79)' .. 
LNBTM -0.387 -0.554 -0.362 -0.256 -0.223 -0.541 -0.014 -0.177 -0.065 -0.107 -0.014 -0.095 
(-3.23)"' (-2.52)" (-3.01)' .. (-2.10) .. (-1.78)' (-2.35) .. (-0.10) (-1.06) (-0.46) (-0.71) (-0.09) (-0.50) 
RHO -0.557 -0.427 -0.559 -0.527 -0.526 -0.419 -0.887 -0.568 -0.876 -0.867 -0.864 -0.551 
(-5.51)' .. (-3.02)"' (-5.53)-· (-5.23)' .. (-5.22r- (-2.97)'- (-9.30)' .. (-5.88)"' (-9.18)"' (-9.11)'- (-9.08)' .. (-5.78)--
ABSRET 0.042 0.041 
(0.05) (0.07) 
VOLD 0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.43) (1.31) (-2.15) .. (-1.93)' 
ILLIQ 0.376 0.477 0.470 0.550 0.093 0.091 0.098 -0.215 
(4.35)' .. (4.46)' .. (4.52)' .. (4.71)·- (3.67) ... (3.31)' .. (3.53)' .. (-3.11)-· 
TRNOVDY -0.036 -0.035 -0.035 -0.028 -0.151 -0.170 -0.147 -0.109 
(-1.05) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-0.47) (-3.95)' .. (-4.31)' .. (-3.57) ... (-2.11) .. 
RLAG13_8 0.051 0.050 0.037 0.046 0.044 0.079 
(5.28)' .. (5.18)"' (2.92)' .. (4.55)' .. (4.36)' .. (7.47)' .. 
RLAG7 _2 -0.034 -0.035 -0.092 -0.098 -0.099 -0.095 
(-3.43)' .. (-3.53)' .. (-7.43)' .. (-10.52)'- (-10.59)". (-10.01) ... 
DIVYLD -0.055 -0.073 -0.044 0.016 
(-1.64) (-1.58) (-1.89)' (0.59) 
RMSEDAY 0.030 -0.319 -0.159 -0.364 
(0.26) (-2.20)" (-1.77)' (-3.62)' .. 
CONSTANT 14.996 15.461 13.415 13.169 13.438 16.645 37.005 34.402 36.359 36.828 37.545 36.147 
(19.26)"' (14.15)"' (16.73)' .. (16.02)' .. (14.45)-· (11.90)' .. (45.41)' .. (37.55)' .. (44.14) ... (43.62)' .. (42.85)'- (36.54)"· 
Observations 117642 63717 117642 117494 117494 64015 147797 113816 147797 147227 147227 113935 
Number of firms 1334 1039 1334 1332 1332 1041 1594 1296 1594 1584 1584 1297 
R-squared 0.3028 0.3296 0.3036 0.3043 0.3043 0.3311 0.2720 0.2736 0.2723 0.2740 0.2741 0.2753 
Panel C: 1986-1996 Panel D: 1997-2007 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BETA 0.351 0.198 0.457 0.401 0.291 0.245 0.457 0.293 0.447 0.431 0.283 0.289 
(3.74)*** (1.87)* (4.81)*** (3.88)"** (2.69)"** (2.07)"* (4.41)*** (2.40)** (4.28)*** (3.80)"** (2.48)** (2.24)** 
LNSIZE -2.422 -1.944 -2.389 -2.561 -2.403 -2.048 -2.915 -2.447 -2.860 -2.975 -2.887 -2.581 
(-22.50)*** (-17.09)"** (-22.18)*** (-21.79)*** (-19.44)*** (-16.07)*** (-27.72)"** (-19.63)"** (-26.66)*** (-25.14)"** (-23.24)*** (-18.20)*** 
LNBTM 0.384 0.218 0.372 0.336 0.326 0.178 0.351 0.135 0.346 0.203 0.238 0.062 
(3.80)*** (1.95)* (3.66)"** (3.05)*** (2.89)*** (1.46) (3.73)*** (1.23) (3.72)"** (2.04)** (2.32)"* (0.52) 
RHO -0.306 -0.261 -0.299 -0.308 -0.320 -0.281 -0.223 -0.059 -0.233 -0.272 -0.271 -0.130 
(-3.46) ... (-2.84)*** (-3.37)*** (-3.46)*** (-3.60)*** (-3.06)*** (-2.31 r (-0.56) (-2.41)** (-2.81)*** (-2.80)*** (-1.26) 
ABSRET -0.459 -1.020 
(-0.71) (-1.60) 
VOLD -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
(-4.19)**• (-3.04)"** (-3.15)*** (-1.55) 
ILLIQ 0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.247 1.076 1.337 1.268 1.513 
(3.03)"** (3.03)"** (-1.61) (0.71) (3.70)*** (4.42)*** (4.16)"** (3.34)*** 
TRNOVDY -0.111 -0.127 -0.166 -0.086 0.013 0.006 -0.011 0.028 
(-4.29)*** (-4.43)*** (-5.48)*** (-2.70)*** (0.89) (0.38) (-0.62) (1.67)* 
RLAG13_8 0.041 0.041 0.067 -0.021 -0.023 -0.013 
(4.35)*** (4.25)*** (6.28)*** (-2.43)** (-2.70)*** (-1.22) 
RLAG7_2 -0.133 -0.134 -0.130 -0.092 -0.094 -0.085 
(-14.56)*** (-14.65)"** (-12.20)*** (-9.19)*** (-9.35)"** (-6.51)*** 
DIVYLD 0.027 0.049 -0.114 -0.070 
(1.02) (1.75)* (-2.34)** (-1.46) 
RMSEDAY 0.343 -0.049 0.302 -0.174 
(3.91)*** (-0.46) (4.08)*** (-1.93)* 
CONSTANT 16.227 13.893 16.194 17.434 15.993 14.573 23.511 20.894 23.023 23.974 23.189 22.169 
(23.63)*** (18.55)*** (23.66)"** (23.18)*** (19.08)*** (16.06)*** (31.24)*** (22.51)*** (30.03)*** (28.63)*** (24.59)*** (19.71)*** 
Observations 146184 108434 146184 143417 143417 108589 166941 118756 166941 164705 164705 119071 
Number of firms 1906 1326 1906 1867 1667 1331 2241 1642 2241 2216 2218 1647 
R-squared 0.2105 0.2439 0.2107 0.2126 0.2128 0.2462 0.1824 0.1708 0.1626 0.1637 0.1640 0.1716 
TABLE 4: ALPHAS OF PORTFOLIOS SORTED ON THE INFORMATION PROXY RHO 
This table reports the raw and the risk-adjusted monthly returns (alphas) of decile portfolios sorted on the information proxy, RHO. Decile 
10 corresponds to the highest values of RHO, indicating an informationally rich month, decile 1 just the opposite. The last column, 1-10, refers 
to the portfolio that is long in low RHO stocks and short in high RHO stocks. Portfolios are rebalanced every month based on the percentiles of 
RHO. The time period is from 1966 to 2004. Risk adjustment includes the market, size, book-to-market, momentum, and liquidity factors. White's 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics. 
Decile Portfolio 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1-10 
Panel A: Equal-weighted 
Raw returns 1.080 0.994 1.022 1.011 1.059 1.081 1.021 0.908 0.939 0.880 0.199 
(4.558)*** (4.198)*** (4.240)*** (4.239)*** (4.409)*** (4.406)*** (4.138r* (3.631)*** (3.738)*** (3.437)*** (2.494)** 
CAPM alpha 0.645 0.551 0.571 0.567 0.605 0.622 0.557 0.442 0.468 0.406 0.239 
(5.778)*** (5.299)*** (5.442)*** (5.326)*** (6.001)*** (5.826)*** (5.227)*** (3.953)*** (4.236)*** (3.461)*** (2.999)*** 
Fama-French alpha 0.329 0.237 0.258 0.249 0.301 0.306 0.255 0.109 0.148 0.060 0.269 
(3.728)*** (3.105)*** (3.201)*** (3.088)*** (4.098)*** (3.865)*** (3.163)*** (1.377) (1.929)* (0.749) (3.475)*** 
Four-factor alpha (Momentum) 0.478 0.341 0.348 0.356 0.384 0.417 0.344 0.174 0.193 0.135 0.343 
(5.746)*** (4.577)*** (4.515)*** (4.554)*** (5.227)*** (5.466)*** (4.299)*** (2.172)** (2.443)** (1.697)* (4.363)*** 
Five-factor alpha (PS Liquidity) 0.514 0.375 0.387 0.395 0.419 0.453 0.383 0.220 0.233 0.184 0.330 
(6.393)*** (5.210)*** (5.297)*** (5.199)*** (6.088)*** (6.268)*** (5.135)*** (2.970)*** (3.221)*** (2.546)** (4.210)*** 
Panel B: Value-weighted 
Raw returns 0.571 0.582 0.479 0.557 0.540 0.477 0.450 0.419 0.480 0.389 0.181 
(2.702)*** (2.683)*** (2.279)** (2.673)*** (2.526)** (2.213)** (2.097)** (1.917)* (2.193)** (1.732)* (1.386) 
CAPM alpha 0.168 0.171 0.080 0.161 0.126 0.065 0.040 0.003 0.057 -0.035 0.203 
(1.939)* (1.963)* (0.940) (1.939)* (1.619) (0.763) (0.475) (0.0334) (0.695) (-0.370) (1.522) 
Fama-French alpha 0.141 0.089 0.005 0.115 0.070 0.037 0.017 -0.093 -0.003 -0.101 0.242 
(1.777)* (1.069) (0.0652) (1.510) (0.990) (0.457) (0.213) (-1.109) (-0.0380) (-1.013) (1.782)* 
Four-factor alpha (Momentum) 0.172 0.086 0.016 0.144 0.069 0.063 -0.017 -0.051 -0.016 -0.046 0.218 
(2.050)** (0.973) (0.205) (1.818)* (0.950) (0.737) (-0.207) (-0.561) (-0.194) (-0.454) (1.549) 
Five-factor alpha (PS Liquidity) 0.189 0.100 0.032 0.159 0.077 0.078 0.007 -0.029 0.012 -0.024 0.213 
(2.197)** (1.133) (0.408) (1.975)** (1.053) (0.915) (0.0801) (-0.322) (0.148) (-0.244) (1.483) 
TABLE 5: FIVE-FACTOR ALPHAS OF PORTFOLIOS SORTED ON SIZE AND RHO 
Five factors are: MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, LIQ, which represent risks associated with market, size, 
book-to-market, momentum, and liquidity variables, respectively. Stocks are sorted into quintiles first on 
their market capitalization, then on RHO, resulting in 25 double-sorted portfolios. Quintile 1 refers to lower 
values of market capitalization and RHO, quintile 5 the opposite. 1-5 refers to the portfolio that is long in low 
RHO stocks and short in high RHO stocks. Portfolios are rebalanced every month based on the percentiles 
of market cap and RHO. The time period is from 1966 to 2004. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics. 
Rho Quintile 
Size Quintile 2 3 4 5 1-5 
Panel A: Equal-weighted 
1.351 1.205 1.071 1.066 0.796 0.555 
(12.00)*** (10.34)*** (9. 704 )*** (8. 783)*** (6.961 )*** (4.480)*** 
2 0.455 0.306 0.301 0.262 0.059 0.396 
( 4.466)*** (2.946)*** (2.921 )*** (2. 782)*** (0.593) (3.443)*** 
3 0.295 0.321 0.352 0.182 0.137 0.158 
(3.039)*** (3.485)*** (3.550)*** (1.802)* (1.339) (1.494) 
4 0.226 0.143 0.178 0.086 -0.069 0.295 
(2.453)** (1.613) (2.024)** (0.974) (-0.801) (2. 778)*** 
5 0.099 0.053 0.062 0.040 -0.091 0.190 
(1.308) (0.770) (0.939) (0.557) (-1.260) (1.984)** 
Panel B: Value-weighted 
1.178 0.962 0.843 0.804 0.598 0.580 
(10.06)*** (7.993)*** (7.406)*** (6.876)*** (5.179)*** (4.308)*** 
2 0.426 0.317 0.271 0.237 0.038 0.388 
(4.126)*** (3.109)*** (2.556)** (2.518)** (0.376) (3.241 )*** 
3 0.262 0.300 0.339 0.154 0.117 0.146 
(2.657)*** (3.190)*** (3.380)*** (1.486) (1.120) (1.358) 
4 0.194 0.123 0.173 0.102 -0.036 0.230 
(2.192)** (1.451) (1.991)** ( 1.179) (-0.419) (2.158)** 
5 0.106 0.077 -0.009 -0.048 0.023 0.083 
(1.357) (1.148) (-0.131) (-0.646) (0.321) (0. 744) 
TABLE 6: FAMA-MACBETH REGRESSIONS OF STOCK RETURNS ON RHO AND OTHER STOCK CHARACTERISTICS 
This table reports the time-series averages of the slopes obtained from individual cross-sectional regressions ran every month from 1964 to 
2007. T-statistic is the average slope divided by its time-series standard error. BETA is CAPM's measure of systematic risk, estimated at a yearly 
frequency using daily returns. LNSIZE is the log of market value of equity on the last day of the year prior to the year returns are measured. LNBTM 
is the log of book- to-market ratio, calculated as the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity on the last day of the year prior to 
the year returns are measured. RHO is the proxy for information revelation and is defined as the monthly estimate of the daily correlation between 
(market-adjusted) absolute returns and dollar volume. ABSRET is the firm-specific monthly absolute return and similarly, VOLD is the firm-specific 
monthly dollar volume. ILLIQ is Amihud's liquidity measure, which is defined as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute returns to dollar volume. 
TRNOVDY is the yearly average of daily turnover. RLAG7-2 and RLAG13-8 are geometric averages of lagged returns in the previous 6 months and 
the 6 months before that, respectively. RLAGl is simply the previous month's return. DIVYLD is the yearly sum of ordinary cash dividends divided 
by the price (both adjusted for splits) at the end of the year. RMSEDAY is the estimated volatility of the residuals from the BETA regression. 
BETA, ILLIQ, TRNOVDY, DIVYLD, and RMSEDAY are lagged for one year. RHO, ABSRET and VOLD are lagged for one month. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
BETA 0.241 0.090 0.079 0.080 0.312 0.361 0.371 0.341 0.250 0.062 0.075 0.079 
(1.547) (0.536) (0.469) (0.481) (1.986,- (2.516)- (2.634)-- (2.574)** (2.061)** (0.525) (0.584) (0.612) 
LNSIZE -0.277 -0.141 -0.139 -0.141 -0.158 -0.164 -0.166 -0.161 -0.146 -0.079 -0.099 -0.099 
(-6.773i- (-3.603)*- (-3.532)-- (-3.615)-- (-3.920)*- (-4.172)-* (-4.348)*- (-4.348)*- (-4.221)-- (-2.439,- (-3.012)*- (-3.032)--
LNBTM 0.182 0.093 0.096 0.096 0.190 0.190 0.225 0.240 0.306 0.296 0.191 0.191 
(3.037)-* (1.404) (1.474) (1.483) (3.162,-· (3.204)*- (3.967)*- (4.472,-· (6.090)-- (5.967)*- (3.447i-* (3.435,-· 
RHO -0.320 -0.209 -0.238 -0.346 -0.342 -0.360 -0.369 -0.389 -0.420 -0.239 
(-5.599)-- (-3.434,-· (-3.865,-· (-6.035)-- (-6.153)-* (-6.473)-- (-6.670)-- (-7.130)*- (-7.731)-* (-4.206)*-
ABSRET -0.325 -0.487 -0.390 -0.567 
(-0.741) (-1.113) (-0.973) (-1.427) 
VOLD 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.689) (0.715) (-0.421) (-0.567) 
ILLIQ 0.743 0.755 0.753 0.741 0.708 0.614 0.457 0.444 
(8.443)-- (8.572)- (8.271)-- (8.12oi-· (7.693)*- (6.697)*- (2.781,-· (2.706)-
TRNOVDY -0.025 -0.030 -0.027 -0.035 -0.071 -0.055 -0.057 
(-1.078) (-1.337) (-1.233) (-1.664)* (-3.430)*- (-2.469,- (-2.587)*-
RLAG13_8 0.053 0.050 0.050 0.054 0.074 0.075 
(5.265)-- (5.196)-- (5.264)- (5.794)*- (6.519)-- (6.566)--
RLAG7_2 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.030 0.030 
(2.729,-· (2.145,-• (2.824)*- (1.997)** (2.005)** 
OIVYLD -0.067 -0.041 -0.034 -0.033 
(-3.661)-- (-2.366)** (-1.749)* (-1.701)* 
RMSEDAY 0.336 0.007 0.003 
(5.257)*- (0.108) (0.0407) 
CONSTANT 2.991 2.154 2.126 2.114 2.119 2.150 2.127 2.049 2.288 1.384 1.872 1.835 
(9.435)-- (6.938)*- (6.782,-· (6.818)- (6.713)*- (6.966,-· (7.061i-· (6.973)*- (7.100)*- (4.661,-· (5.824)*- (5.728)*-
Observations 578564 404769 405610 404723 578564 578564 572859 572843 572843 572843 404723 404723 
Number of months 526 479 479 479 526 526 526 526 526 526 479 479 
R-squared 0.002515 0.000736 0.000109 0.000074 0.000986 0.000997 0.00097 0.000913 0.000923 0.001-253 0.000731 0.000617 
TABLE 7: FAMA-MACBETH REGRESSIONS OF STOCK RETURNS ON RHO AND SYSTEMATIC LIQUIDITY BETAS 
This table reports the time-series averages of the slopes obtained from individual monthly cross-sectional regressions. T-statistic is the aver-
age slope divided by its time-series standard error. The sample period is 1968-2006, depending on the availability of the liquidity factor. In Panel A, 
BETALIQ is the systematic liquidity beta of Pastor and Stambaugh. In Panels Band C BETALIQ is one of the two liquidity component betas of 
Sadka. BETAMKT, BETASIZE, BETABTM are the estimated betas of stocks with respect to the market, size and book-to-market factors. These 
betas are estimated in the pre-sample period with a multivariate regression of monthly returns on factors using a 60--month window. Regressions are 
rolled over every month, hence betas are updated every month. RMSEMON is the estimate of the volatility of the residuals from those regressions. 
All other variables are as defined previously in the fixed-effects specification. 
Panel A Pastor and Stambaugh (1968-2005) Panel B: Sadka Transitory Fixed (1988-2006) Panel C: Sadka Permanent Variable (1988-2006) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
BETA 0.053 0.063 0.218 0.212 0.218 0.235 
(0.389) (0.466) (0.967) (0.950) (0.967) (1.052) 
LNSIZE -0.100 -0.102 -0.070 -0.073 -0.070 -0.070 
(-2.716)- (-2.778)* .. (-1.335) (-1.400) (-1.335) (-1.350) 
LNBTM 0.225 0.230 0.166 0.165 0.166 0.165 
(3.782)*- (3.886)*** (2.581)** (2.578)** (2.581)- (2.586)"" 
RHO -0.279 -0.280 -0.309 -0.153 -0.153 -0.236 -0.153 -0.154 -0.237 
(-4.583)*** (-4.606)*** (-5.145)*** (-1.758)* (-1.765)* (-2.818)*- (-1.758)* (-1.771)" (-2.820)*** 
DIVYLD -0.032 -0.031 -0.003 -0.029 -0.030 0.001 -0.029 -0.028 0.003 
(-1.504) (-1.475) (-0.140) (-1.054) (-1.086) (0.0338) (-1.054) (-1.007) (0.0978) 
ILLIQ 0.545 0.543 0.758 0.783 0.725 0.953 0.783 0.756 0.986 
(3.166)*** (3.148)*** (4.675)**• (2.306)"* (2.131)** (2.976)*** (2.306)** (2.259)"* (3.145)*** 
TRNOVDY -0.056 -0.055 -0.043 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 
(-2.363)** (-2.356)"* (-1.812)* (-0.162) (-0.149) (-0.0730) (-0.162) (-0.218) (-0.0837) 
RLAG13_8 0.077 0.078 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.043 0.060 0.057 0.041 
(6.389)"** (6.452)*** (5.222)*** (3.550)"** (3.537)- (2.617)*** (3.550)*** (3.399)* .. (2.516)** 
RLAG7_2 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.394) (1.432) (1.380) (0.0303) (-0.0637) (-0.101) (0.0303) (0.0509) (0.0348) 
BETALIQ 0.133 0.164 0.012 0.017 0.009 0.011 
(1.163) (1.226) (1.872)* (2.328)"* (0.575) (0.725) 
BETAMKT 0.029 0.069 0.082 
(0.237) (0.372) (0.447) 
BETASIZE 0.115 -0.011 -0.022 
(1.372) (-0.0931) (-0.188) 
BETABTM 0.211 0.185 0.173 
(2.698)*** (1.431) (1.331) 
RMSEMON 2.722 4.908 4.811 
(1.657)* (2.337)"* (2.254) .. 
CONSTANT 1.928 1.934 0.808 1.577 1.633 0.561 1.577 1.583 0.552 
(5.311)"*" (5.323)- (3.967)*** (3.376)* .. (3.463)**• (2.349)*" (3.376)*"* (3.384)*** (2.321)"* 
Observations 374302 374302 374302 184432 184432 184432 184432 184432 184432 
Number of months 445 445 445 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R-squared 0.000886 0.000896 0.000924 0.00066 0.000709 0.000517 0.00066 0.000725 0.000485 
FIGURE 1: PRICE CHANGES AND TRADING VOLUME AROUND KNOWN INFORMATION EVENTS 
RHO is the monthly estimate of the daily correlation between the absolute returns and dollar trad-
ing volume of a stock. ABSRET and VOLD are the residuals calculated from the estimated parameters 
of a pre-sample 60 month regression of absolute retuns and dollar volume on their market counterparts. 
The residuals are then divided by their corresponding estimated standard deviations to achieve cross-firm 
comparability. Figures plot the cross-sectional means of these variables against event time. In Panel A the 















Panel A: Earnings Announcements 
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FIGURE 2: AVERAGE RETURNS OF STOCKS BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION REVELATION 
A month in which information has been revealed (t=0) is defined as the information proxy, RHO, 
being above its 90th percentile value for the life of a stock. Returns for that stock in the previous and 
subsequent six months, along with their respective differences are then averaged cross-sectionally in event 
time. Below figures plot these averages against event time. Panel A uses all available data, other panels 
represent subsamples. Panel B excludes months in which earnings announcement were made. In Panel C, 
only "Bad News" events are used. "Bad News" is defined by the return in the information revelation month 
being negative. In Panel D only "Good News" event are used. Good News" is defined by the return in the 
information revelation month being positive. 
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Abstract 
I use the financial crisis of 2008 as a natural experiment to identify the value 
of non-financial firms' stake in the banking system. Unrated firms underperform 
investment grade rated firms when Lehman Brothers fails, and overperform when 
the Treasury injects capital into the nine largest US banks. These differences are 
economically significant, around 1.5% in daily returns, and do not appear to be 
borne out of risk or the creditworthiness of the firm. Lenders' financial health -
proxied by their capital ratios, deposits, and mortgage exposure - is also related 
to the borrowers' stock performance. Longer relationships and broader syndication 
benefit the borrowers, but greater reliance on credit lines hurt them. The findings 
highlight the interconnectedness of the banking system and the relevance of the 
11bank lending channel 11 even for large public corporations. 
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1 Introduction 
Theories of financial intermediation argue the uniqueness of banks based on their 
informational advantage in evaluating and monitoring borrowers (Fama (1985), Diamond 
(1984)) and as providers of liquidity (Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Kashyap, Rajan, and 
Stein (2002)). If bank financing in the form of credit lines cannot easily be substituted 
for, then the firms that rely on them ought to have a valuable stake in the durability of 
the banking system. The financial crisis of 2008 provides a unique opportunity - a natural 
experiment - to identify the value of this stake because the shocks to the banking system 
did not spring from business lending, nor from monetary policy actions, both of which 
usually present endogeneity and reverse causality problems. I examine changes in the 
market value of non-financial firms in response to shocks to the banking system which I 
take as exogenous. I mostly focus on the market reaction to two key events that abruptly 
altered investors' expectations regarding bank solvency. The first event, the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, shook investors' perception of what "too big to fail" meant 1 and 
cast doubts about the durability of the entire banking system. The second, US Treasury 
Department's decision to use funds from the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) to invest directly in the nine largest financial institutions 2 , alleviated these fears 
to a large extent and helped restore investor confidence. 
Firms naturally differ in their utilization of bank lending and ability to access capital 
markets. I proxy for "bank-dependence" using the firm's credit rating and other loan 
characteristics when available. Following Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), I consider 
firms without a credit rating (but with short-term, or long-term, debt outstanding) to 
be the most bank-dependent, followed by speculative or "junk" rated firms. Investment-
grade rated firms that have access to alternate sources of capital (e.g., public bonds, 
1 With $691 billion in assets, Lehman's was the largest bankruptcy in the history of the United States. 
2 These nine institutions were: JP Morgan, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, State Street, Bank of New York Mellon. 
2 
commercial paper) are taken to be the least bank-dependent. In the universe of public 
Compustat firms, I find that unrated and junk rated firms underperform investment-
grade rated firms by about 1.5%, and 0.9%, respectively, on the day of Lehman Brothers' 
bankruptcy. Investment-grade firms tend to be larger, however these differences in returns 
are not driven by smaller firms. Firm size is negatively related to returns in the face of a 
negative shock and among a subset of larger firms the underperformance of unrated and 
junk rated firms is even more pronounced: 2.2% and 1.6%, respectively. All returns used 
in the regressions are risk-adjusted using the Fama and French (1996) three factors and 
additional control variables are included to proxy for potentially missing risk factors (i.e. 
bankruptcy risk, financial distress risk, liquidity risk, etc.). 
When hit by a positive shock, such as the TARP bailout of the nine largest US banks, 
all of the aforementioned differences in stock returns reverse signs. Unrated firms now 
overperform investment-grade firms by 1.5%, and junk rated firms no longer underperform. 
Firms with low cash flow who have underperformed in reaction to Lehman Brothers' 
bankruptcy, overperform with the announcement of the direct capital injections of the US 
Treasury to the ailing banking system. These results suggest that the TARP benefitted 
not only the recipient banks, but also the non-financial firms who rely on the "bank 
lending channel 11 (Bernanke and Gertler (1995) ). As a more direct piece of evidence on 
the effects of the TARP, I show that the firms with pre-existing lending relationships with 
the first nine banks that received government capital further gain in market value on the 
announcement of the program. 
In addition to Compustat, I use bank loan level data from the DealScan database 
to link borrowers to lenders in the pre-crisis period (2006-2007), hence define a banking 
"relationship". Consistent with prior studies that document the value of banking rela-
tionships such as Petersen and Rajan (1994) or Berger and Udell (1995), I find that the 
further back the relationship goes, higher is the stock return of the borrower on the day 
of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. These "relationships" also allow me to study the effects 
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of lenders' financial health on the borrower. Banks with higher capital ratios and more 
core deposits have a positive effect on their borrowers' stock return when Lehman fails. 
In addition, banks' mortgage exposure has a negative effect. These effects are stronger 
for junk rated firms and not significant at all for investment grade firms. 
DealScan breaks down each "deal II into its term loan and credit lines components. It 
turns out that the credit line component plays an important and an unexpected role in the 
borrowers' performance. Credit lines provide liquidity insurance (Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1998)) or are used as an alternative to holding costly cash (Sufi (2009) 3); a priori, one 
would expect higher valuations for firms who have been able to secure more lines before 
the liquidity shock arrives. However, the data reveals that the level of committed credit 
lines before the crisis ( as a fraction of the firm's assets at the end of 2007) is negatively 
related to the firm's stock performance on the day of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. One 
explanation for this result might be the risk of rolling over these lines, or making full 
use of them, in the wake of Lehman's collapse. Indeed, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) 
demonstrate that the new issuance of revolving credit facilities declined significantly in 
the last quarter of 2008, and Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2010) show that 
banks preference for liquid assets fueled a decline in credit origination. Huang (2009) 
argues that the stressed banks could ration takedown volumes on existing lines by the 
power of strict covenants they have set initially. Another explanation might be that 
the market was expecting more banks to default following Lehman and thus valued these 
credit lines as worthless. Whichever is the explanation, it is clear that greater endorsement 
of credit lines implies greater dependence on the banking system. The underperformance 
of such firms suggests that credit lines are not a bulletproof tool for managing corporate 
liquidity; they can easily become a handicap if bank durability becomes suspect due to 
reasons completely beyond a firms' control. 
3Sufi (2009) details the link between cash holdings, cash flow, lines of credit and financial covenants. 
He shows that firms who can not access credit lines due to low cash flow choose to hold more cash instead. 
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The results are robust to numerous controls and estimation methods. Firstly, unrated 
firms that underperform significantly do not appear to be financially distressed at the 
end of 2007 when variables are observed. They rank similar to investment grade rated 
firms on leverage, cash holdings, and cash flow. Industry effects can not explain the return 
differences either, as I control for industry effects using dummy variables, or clustering the 
standard errors by industry, or by a generalized least squares approach where observations 
are weighted by their estimated industry variances. Weighted-least-squares estimation 
actually increases both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the estimates. All 
returns are measured over one day, hence I include the bid-ask spread in all my regressions 
to control for stock market liquidity. I also repeat my tests on days with banking related 
events other than the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers or the TARP announcement, and 
find qualitatively similar, albeit weaker results. Another concern might be that these 
return differences do not reflect the response to the banking shocks but simply exist as 
unexplained patterns in the data. To address this concern, I construct a counterfactual 
by running the same cross-sectional regressions on every trading day from 2005 to 2007. 
Comparing investment grade rated firms with unrated firms as before, I find that there 
are no days in this pre-crisis period where the difference in abnormal returns were greater 
than the one observed on September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. Lastly, I 
run a panel regression in 2008 where I interact event day dummies with the variables 
that were significant in the cross-sectional regressions. The interaction terms all come 
out significant whereas the characteristics by themselves do not. This result supports the 
conclusion that events such as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers or the TARP were 
highly unusual in their impact and thus fitting choices for studying the sensitivity of 
non-financial firms to the health of the banking system. 
This paper extends the literature on banking relationships by demonstrating the uni-
versal and the interconnected nature of their value. Previous literature have focused on 
lender ( or borrower )-specific events to infer value. I take the failures and bailouts of banks 
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as shocks to the whole banking system and explore the repercussions for all non-financial 
firms. For example, Slavin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) run an event study on borrow-
ing firms when their relationship bank fails and is later rescued by the FDIC. In their 
paper there is only one bank, Continental Illinois, and 53 borrowers. In contrast, I use 
all (public) borrower-lender pairs available in the DealScan database from 2006 to the 
end of 2007. Moreover, I exclude the failed bank: Lehman Brothers. Thus, the nega-
tive abnormal returns observed for the borrowers cannot be due to the failure of their 
lender, as was the case for Continental Illinois. Similarly, the positive abnormal returns 
on the TARP announcement day are not strictly limited to firms with existing relation-
ships with the banks that were to receive the government capital; all firms benefit. These 
widespread effects can be interpreted as a reflection of the changes in the "cost of credit 
intermediation" described by Bernanke (1983) in his analysis of the great depression. 
There are other approaches used in the literature to demonstrate different dimensions 
of the value of banking relationships. James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and 
Best and Zhang (1993) all find that the public announcements of new bank credit agree-
ments generally increase the share price of a firm, hence conclude that new relationships 
must create value. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) show that 
relationship's length is related to the availability and the cost of funds for the borrower. 
Their focus though, is on particularly small firms - firms collected from the National Sur-
vey of Small Business Finance. The results in my paper extend that value to large public 
corporations. Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) show that bank characteristics affect 
the costs of borrowing, but they do not study the market valuations of borrowers as I do. 
Kang and Stulz (2000) on the other hand, study market valuations but do not link them 
to bank characteristics. Their main finding is that more bank-dependent firms in Japan 
lost more market value during the crash of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in the early 90s. 
Chava and Purnanandam (2008) is the closest paper to mine in terms of methodology. 
They too study the performance of bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent firms faced 
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with an exogenous shock. The shock in their paper is the Russian bond crisis of 1998 and 
they find evidence supporting the value of banking relationships. Analogous to my finding 
that a bank's mortgage exposure in the recent crisis negatively affects its borrowers, they 
find that a bank's investment in foreign securities negatively affects its borrowers during 
the Russian bond crisis. The results in their paper and mine are consistent throughout 
howev:er there's one important distinction: The Russian bond crisis, while having the ad-
vantage of being a truly exogenous event, does not inform us about the interconnectedness 
of the banking system. Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy on the other hand, was a unique 
event in that it has exposed just how interconnected the US banking system has become. 
This paper is also related to the literature on bank lines of credit and corporate liq-
uidity management. Demiroglu and James (2010) provide an excellent review of this 
literature hence I will not list all the papers here in the interest of brevity. Two papers 
however are worth mentioning, because the atypical nature of this financial crisis may ap-
pear in contrast to their arguments. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) build a theoretical 
model to explain why it would be in the banks' interest to provide liquidity. In this model, 
banks have a natural hedge against liquidity shocks because of synergies in simultaneous 
lending and deposit taking. Gatev and Strahan (2006) provide empirical evidence for 
this model by showing that takedown demand on credit lines increases at times when the 
commercial paper market tightens. In both of these papers banks' willingness to lend 
also increases at the time of the liquidity shock because banks experience an inflow of 
liquid assets from investors who (presumably) perceive banks as a "safe haven". What the 
recent financial crisis highlights and what the Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) model 
does not capture is that, banks can lose that credibility - as they clearly did after the 
collapse of Lehman - and become liquidity constrained themselves. This in turn makes 
credit lines less effective as a tool for. managing corporate liquidity for non-financial firms 
in a systemic crisis. 
There is also a strand of literature which studies the real effects of the financial cri-
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sis and more generally, how shocks to the banking sector propagate to the real sector. 
Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2009), Campello, Giambona, Graham, 
and Harvey (2009), Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010), lvashina and Scharfstein 
(2010) all find that one reason firms were investing less during the crisis was because of 
credit constraints. This finding is consistent with previous studies such as Gibson (1995) 
who shows that in Japan firms' investment is sensitive to the credit ratings of their main 
banks, or Peek and Rosengren (2000) who show that an exogenous loan supply shock 
originating from Japan hampers investment in the U.S. One area I do not explore in this 
paper is the real effects of the banking events I have chosen to study. While real effects are 
just as important as market valuations, the proximity of the events makes it impossible to 
observe changes in investment and/or operating performance in such short time frames. 
2 Background on the Financial Crisis 
While the majority of bank failures and bailouts occurred in 2008, it is now generally 
understood that the financial crisis had its roots in the subprime lending practices of the 
previous years. Freddie Mac's statement on February 27, 2007 that it would no longer 
buy the most risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities is marked as the 
first event of the financial crisis by the St. Louis Fed4 • Rest of 2007 saw more than 
eighty subprime lenders either closing down their operations or declaring bankruptcy 5 , 
some being among the largest players in the mortgage market (New Century Financial, 
American Home Mortgage, Countrywide Financial, etc.). Initially, these failures gave the 
appearance of being confined to subprime lenders in the face of declining housing prices 
and rising foreclosures - 11 [the impact of] the problems in the subprime market seems likely 
to be contained II told the Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to the Congress in his testimony 
4Source:http://timeline.stlouisfed.org 
5The list can be found at: 
http:// online. wsj .com/ public/ resources/ documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html 
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before the Joint Economic Committee on March 28, 2007. This view turned out to be 
overly optimistic unfortunately; the big investment banks were also highly exposed to the 
mortgage market through mortgage-backed-securities and other structured products, and 
perhaps more dangerously so because of the complexity of these financial instruments and 
the lax accounting standards. Eventually, these so-called "toxic assets" would erode their 
balance sheets, wipe out investor confidence, and fuel the liquidity crisis 6 that would push 
major banks into insolvency. 
In hindsight, Bear Stearns' sudden collapse in early 2008 is illustrative of how even the 
most reputable financial institutions can become insolvent overnight. The event is also 
consequential in terms of shaping market expectations on government's handling of the 
crisis. In early March of 2008, investors were growing increasingly uncomfortable with 
the quality of Bear Stearns' collateral. They started to pull out their money, putting 
strain on the firm's day-to-day funding ability. In what amounted to a bank run, on 
March 14, Bear Stearns had to call for an emergency loan from the Fed and was later sold 
to JP Morgan with the Fed bearing the risk of $29 billion of Bear Stearns's less liquid 
assets. This was a major turning point in Fed policy. Traditionally, the Fed has lent to 
commercial banks in financial panics, but not to investment banks. It has accepted only 
US Treasuries for collateral. For the first time since the Great Depression, it invoked the 
"unusual and exigent circumstances" clause of the Federal Reserve Act, which authorize 
lending by reserve banks to individuals, partnerships and corporations, practically anyone 
they see fit. Naturally, this set a precedent for rescuing "too big to fail" Wall Street firms. 
And the Fed wasn't the only regulator reinforcing the belief in "too big to fail"; FDIC 
took over IndyMac, one of the largest mortgage banks in California, in July of the same 
year, and later that September the Treasury ended up placing mortgage giants Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into federal conservatorship. 
6 See Brunnermeier (2009) for an in-depth analysis of how the subprime mortage crisis turned into a 
liquidity crisis. 
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When Lehman Brothers reported a loss of $3.9 billion for its 3rd quarter (on top of 
2.8 billion it had written down for the 2nd quarter) within the same week of Fannie and 
Freddie's bailout, the anticipated course of action was selling off some of its divisions to 
raise capital while the Fed would provide the much needed liquidity. On many occasions 
the Fed, as well as the Treasury, have publicly stated that big banks posed a systemic 
risk to the economy, therefore allowing them to fail would depress the economy even 
further. Timothy Geithner, the president of the New York Fed, and Henry Paulson, the 
secretary of the Treasury, called Lehman and two potential buyers, Bank of America and 
Barclays, into a meeting over the weekend to broker a deal before the markets opened on 
Monday, September 15. The markets were anxious but some kind of deal was expected. 
Neither bidder however, wanted to stand behind Lehman's liabilities without government 
guarantees. Fearing the public backlash over putting more taxpayer money at risk, the 
Fed and the Treasury balked and Lehman suddenly found itself with no other option than 
filing for bankruptcy. 
[Figure 1 here} 
On September 15, 2008, investors woke up to a world that no longer offered implicit 
government guarantees, a world in which no bank was "too big to fail". Counterparty 
risk became the foremost concern and markets began to freeze up. In Figure 1, we see 
this evidenced by the sharp rise in the TED spread following the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. The TED spread, difference between the interest rates on 3-month LIBOR and 
3-month T-bills, serves as an indicator of the banks' default risk. On September 15, 2008, 
it rose to 201 basis points, and in the next two days it topped 300. Historically it has 
hovered around 50 basis points. For the rest of the month it kept rising, signaling the 
ever increasing fear of bank failures. 
By the time the TED spread reached its peak value of 465 basis points on Friday, 
October 10th, the Fed's efforts to restore confidence in the markets have proven to be 
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ineffective. The Treasury stepped in with the recently established TARP funds 7 . The top 
officials at the nine largest U.S. banks were called into an emergency meeting by Henry 
Paulson, who pressed for the government's plan to inject capital directly into these nine 
institutions. Under his proposal these institutions were to receive an aggregate amount of 
$125 billion via the sale of preferred stock to the US Treasury. A unanimous agreement 
was reached that day and a public announcement was made the next morning declaring 
the names of the nine banks and the amounts of capital they would be receiving. The 
markets cheered. The TED spread stopped rising after this event, dropped roughly by 
100 basis points that week, and gradually settled down to normal levels within the next 
six months as more banks took advantage of the TARP. 
3 Data and Methodology 
An all-too-common problem in empirical work on banking relationships is separating 
demand shocks from supply shocks. Banks may be distressed because firms are distressed 
and have difficulty paying back their loans, or there might be latent economic factors 
that undermine both parties' performance. The current financial crisis presents a unique 
opportunity in this respect; because the crisis had its origins in subprime mortgages and 
the structured products derived from these mortgages, events can be viewed as exogenous 
shocks to the supply of credit for businesses. Assuming that the stock market immediately 
prices in the value implications of these shocks, the firm's daily (risk-adjusted) stock return 
can be used as a proxy for the value of its stake in the banking system. The variation in 
the firms' dependence on bank financing allows the value of the banking relationship to be 
pinned down when the "bank lending channel" is impaired (or repaired). This "natural 
experiment II approach allows me to avoid reverse causality issues that often plague similar 
7 After an initial rejection on September 29, the Congress passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 on October 3, which established the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP). 
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studies on banking relationships. 
The basic methodology I use throughout the paper is cross-sectional regressions of 
abnormal stock returns on borrower, lender, and loan deal characteristics. The model is: 
(1) 
where A~ is the abnormal return of stock i, Xi is a vector of firm characteristics for 
stock i, Bi is a vector of firm i's bank's characteristics, Li is a vector of firm i's loan deal 
characteristics, and Di is a vector of credit rating indicators. /3, 'Y, <5, \ are the parameters 
to be estimated and Ei is the residual. 
For Di, I use two dummy variables to represent three mutually exclusive categories: 
investment-grade rated debt, speculative-grade ("junk") rated debt, and unrated debt. 
Firms that have no debt (all equity) are dropped. Following Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 
(1994), I assume unrated debt to be bank debt. Junk rated firms are also quite likely to be 
users of bank debt since it is expensive for them to issue new bonds. Including them with 
a dummy or excluding them altogether from the sample do not change the results in any 
way. In all regressions investment-grade rated firms are the reference (omitted) group. 
S&P Ratings for long-term debt are obtained from Compustat and matched to the month 
of the fiscal year end in 2007 for each firm. Covenant violation data is obtained from 
Amir Sufi's website 8 . All regressions also include (but do not report) industry dummies 
based on the Fama-French 12 industry definitions 9. 
I define abnormal return as the realized minus the expected return according to 
the Fama and French (1996) three factor model. The parameters of the model are 
(pre)estimated for each firm by a multivariate regression using the time-series of daily 
8Source: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.htm . See Nini, Sufi, and Smith (2009) for 
the collection of this data. 
9 Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Using finer 
industry classifications, such as the Fama-French 49 industry definitions, do not affect the results in any 
meaningful way. 
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returns from CRSP, in the year prior to the year in which the cross-sectional regressions 
are run (e.g., 2007 daily returns are used for parameter estimates for the cross-sectional 
regressions to be run on September 15, 2008). More specifically: 
(2) 
where Ri is the realized return of stock i on event day t, r ft is the risk-free rate on 
day t, bi, s1 , hi are the pre-estimated parameters, and M KTt, SM Bt, HM Lt are the three 
factors of Fama and French (1996). 
The first part of the analysis uses all public firms in Compustat, without taking into 
account the relationship between a specific firm and a bank. Unrated firms are simply 
considered to be dependent on the banking system as a whole. The more detailed analysis 
of the banking relationship requires matching borrowers to lenders. The DealScan data-
base from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) acts as the centerpiece to my study in this 
respect. DealScan provides detailed information on loan agreements such as, the type of 
the loan, facility amount, lead arrangers and participants, prices, fees, etc. Most of the 
data originates from commercial loans filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). The rest is collected through LPC's own research. Although the coverage is exten-
sive, it does not represent the complete universe of loan agreements; there is a tilt towards 
large public companies. This bias however, is not necessarily a concern for the validity 
of the results. Because the value of banking relationships should be greater for smaller 
firms ( as theory suggests), underrepresentation of these firms in the sample should make 
the differences smaller, making it more difficult to find statistically significant results. 
The main identifier in DealScan is the borrower's name and I first match these to 
the Compustat identifier "gvkey" on a yearly basis using the link file from Michael R. 
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Roberts 10 . I manually go over the unmatched names to check for alternate spellings, 
acronyms and other errors. I hand-match the lender names in DealScan to the CRSP 
'd 'fi II II h' h 1 ent1 er permco s, w 1c are then matched to the Call Report regulatory high holding 
company codes 11 . This matching process, by construction, forces both the borrower and 
the lender to be public companies, and the lenders to be either commercial banks or bank 
holding companies. To the extent that public companies should find it easier to raise 
capital compared to their private counterparts, the reported market values of banking 
relationships can be considered conservative. 
I identify a firm's relationship bank as the "lead arranger" in a loan deal (in addition 
to "arranger" there are other labels in DealScan such as "agent", or "bookrunner", that 
designate this role). While most loans are syndicated, the origination falls in the hands of 
the lead bank 12• I drop all other participant banks. The universe of borrowers is further 
narrowed by the following criteria: 
• I drop all loan types other than credit lines. This is because credit lines represent 
commitments by the bank as opposed to amounts actually drawn, and thus may bet-
ter characterize the level of dependence of a firm on banks. Credit lines are usually 
rolled over as well, which makes them a better proxy for the ongoing relationship 
than the one-time only term loans. 
• Firms in the financial, insurance, real estate (SIC codes between 6000-7000), and 
construction (SIC codes between 1520-1600), sectors are excluded to avoid endo-
geneity issues. 
• Deals in which Lehman Brothers is identified as the lead arranger are dropped. 
10See Chava and Roberts (2008) for the details on the construction of the link between DealScan and 
Compustat identifiers. 
11 I thank Philip E. Strahan for providing me with the link between Call Report codes and CRSP 
permcos. 
12There are cases when there is more than one lead bank in a deal. Using either one of the lead 
banks gives yields similar results. 
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While Lehman was not a big supplier of credit lines to businesses, its clients would 
be highly likely to underperform when faced with its unexpected bankruptcy. 
• Firms with less than 125 days of trading in 2007 are dropped. This is simply to 
obtain more precise parameter estimates used in the calculation of abnormal returns. 
• The firm should be trading on the two event dates: September 15, 2008 and October 
14, 2008. 
Some firms have multiple lines with multiple banks. To reduce the sample to a one 
observation per firm, I average all bank and deal characteristics in proportion to the sizes 
of the loans. The final sample contains 880 unique borrowers and 34 unique lenders. 
4 Results 
4.1 Compustat firms 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of borrower characteristics across the three 
long-term debt rating categories. The statistics are estimated from data in 2007, and 
therefore represent a snapshot of the financial conditions of the firms before the test 
period. The first thing to note is the size difference between rated and unrated firms. 
While the median unrated firm has market capitalization of $247 million, the median 
investment-grade rated firm has around $9 billion. This is to be expected because we 
know that firms gain access to public bond markets as they mature, nevertheless, it calls 
attention to the importance of controlling for size in the regression analyses. 
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 is also helpful in eliminating financial distress as the potential driver of the 
underperformance of unrated firms. Compared to investment grade rated firms, unrated 
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firms hold approximately three times as much cash ( as a fraction of their assets), yet 
at the same time they are less levered. Under these conditions it should not be more 
difficult for these firms to meet their short-term obligations. The median book-to-market 
ratios are also similar - 0.413 for investment grade firms and 0.469 for unrated firms -
another indication that the unrated group's market valuations are not on average inferior 
to investment grade before the crisis. 
Table 2 presents eight cross-sectional regression results, four on each event date. OLS 
standard errors are reported. Industry dummies are included to control for heteroskedas-
ticity. The three credit rating categories are represented by the two dummy variables, 
"JUNK" RATED and UNRATED (omitted group is the investment grade rating). All 
specifications control for size (logarithm of market value of equity), and in addition, a 
subset of larger firms is analyzed separately. In Column 4 of both panels I restrict the 
sample to firms whose market values exceed $391 million. This size cutoff is the market 
value of the smallest investment-grade rated firm in Compustat. The rationale is that 
any firm smaller than that carries no information on the utility of having access to public 
bond markets. 
[Table 2 here} 
On the day of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy (Panel A), the estimated coefficient on 
UNRATED is -1.490 for the whole sample, and -2.157 for the larger firms subsample. The 
interpretation of these coefficients is that the firms with access to public bond markets 
significantly overperform those without, on a risk-adjusted basis. If one considers junk 
rated firms as also being dependent on bank lending (issuing bonds for these firms would 
be costly), their underperformance of 1.62% (Panel A, Column 4) provides additional 
support for the idea that banks provide value. These results are unlikely to be driven by 
small firms; not only dropping smaller firms in Column 4 makes the results stronger, but 
logSIZE actually comes in negatively significant (t=-3.57) in this specification. It might 
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be that once certain benefits of being a large firm are taken into account with the control 
variables, size weights down the firm in a crisis. 
Note that the differences in returns due to the firm's credit rating (or lack thereof), 
are over and on top of their performance related to cash flow and leverage. While in a 
Modigliani-Miller type of world the type of financing should have no effect on the value 
of the firm, in the real-world of financial frictions we expect firms with high leverage 
and low cash flow to be more sensitive to the shocks to the financial system. They may 
run into trouble servicing their debt or rolling it over, they may fall short of necessary 
working capital, or they may have to let go of positive NPV projects cause they can not 
fund them. All these factors would decrease firm value, and in fact, this is exactly what 
the data exhibit: EBITDA is positively, LEVERAGE is negatively related to returns. 
Both variables are highly statistically significant at the 1 % level. One can also view these 
variables taken together as a rough measure of the firm's dependence on external finance; 
then the conclusion is that the financial crisis had adverse effects on firms who called 
for more external finance. COVENANT VIOLATE dummy is also significant for the 
whole sample, and the larger firms subsample. The negative sign implies that firms who 
have violated the covenants on their bank loans were hurt more by Lehman Brothers' 
bankruptcy. This is consistent with the idea that these firms would find it more difficult 
to obtain new financing from banks. In a liquidity crisis banks are likely to ration credit 
and covenant violations allow them to do so without breaching their loan contracts. 
In Panel B, I perform the same tests on the second event date, the public announce-
ment of the nine TARP banks who have agreed to receive government capital. Most 
coefficients flip signs. In particular, the unrated firms outperform investment-grade firms 
between 1.5% to 1.7%. This positive abnormal return indicates that the capital injections 
under TARP were perceived by the market to be beneficial to those firms whose primary 
providers of credit were banks. A further benefit can be observed by the positive coeffi-
cient on LEVERAGE in the last column. Overperformance of firms with high leverage 
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hints at the expectation of the credit markets to function smoothly again. Overall, these 
results imply that the TARP was met with success, at least at its inception. It would be 
hasty to conclude however, that this was the right policy response to the crisis without 
investigating the TARP's long-term consequences. 
4.2 DealScan firms 
In this section I present more detailed evidence on the value of banking relationships, 
utilizing loan level data from DealScan. DealScan offers a comprehensive selection of loans, 
though it is not the complete universe. The similarity of the borrower characteristics in 
Table 3 to the ones in Table 1 from Compustat assures us that DealScan sample is likely 
to be representative. One notable difference is the median size of the unrated firm - $708 
million in DealScan compared to $24 7 million in Compustat - but as pointed out earlier, 
this bias towards larger firms makes the comparisons between unrated firms and the 
investment grade rated firms more appropriate. Similar to the Compustat sample, unrated 
firms do not display any signs of financial distress. They rank similar to investment 
grade firms on cash holdings, cash flow, and leverage. The number of unrated firms is 
reduced considerably when we move onto DealScan; 346 compared to 1687 in Compustat. 
If anything, this should increase the standard errors and result in more conservative 
estimates. 
[Table 3 here] 
Three new variables, LEAD BANK TIER 1 CAP. RATIO, LEAD BANK DEPOSITS, 
and LEAD BANK MORTGAGE, are obtained from the Call Report in the last quarter 
of 2007. They are intended to proxy for the financial health of a bank who acts as 
the lead arranger in a credit line deal. All are reported as a fraction of banks' total 
assets. If a bank is a subsidiary of a bank holding company they are aggregated at the 
holding company level. If a firm has more than one credit line with different banks, they 
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are averaged in proportion to the size of the facility. Table 3 shows that these lender 
characteristics are roughly similar across the borrowers' credit rating categories (median 
deposits is exactly the same for all three groups, for instance). This similarity makes it 
relatively safe to assume that when borrowers chose their banks ( or banks chose their 
borrowers), the financial state of the bank did not factor into the decision. 
Summary statistics on the deal characteristics reveal that unrated firms have, on 
average, shorter relationships with their banks, pay a higher price for the credit facility, 
rely more heavily on credit lines ( as a fraction of their assets), and have access to fewer 
number of banks to draw on their lines. All these characteristics point to their stake in 
the durability of the banking system. 
/Table 4 here) 
In Table 4, the variables previously shown to be significant in explaining the cross-
section of returns in the Compustat sample, are again shown to be significant. Coefficients 
in column 1 are similar to the ones in Table 2 in significance and magnitude. When 
new variables are introduced, the underperformance of non-investment grade firms is 
slightly reduced to around 1 %. Some of the variation in returns is now captured up 
by bank and deal characteristics. LEAD BANK TIER 1 CAP. RATIO is statistically 
significant with a positive sign on the Lehman bankruptcy date, and a negative sign on 
the TARP announcement date. This means that firms who had prior relationships with 
banks which held more equity capital were harmed less by Lehman's failure, and firms 
whose relationship banks held less equity capital were helped more by the governments' 
recapitalization efforts. Standardized coefficients are reported for the bank ratios thus, 
one standard deviation in the lender's capital ratio corresponds to 0.48%, or 0.67%, daily 
return depending on the event day. The economic significance of this effect is quite 
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large when one considers the fact that capital ratios of most banks are quite similar 13 . 
Besides the magnitude, there is yet another economic insight that can be gleaned from 
this variable. The positive abnormal return attributable to the bank's capital ratio on 
the TARP announcement date implies that the Treasury's plans for capital injections had 
a positive impact on all banks and their borrowers, regardless of whether the bank was 
named at the announcement or not. This is evidence of the interconnectedness nature 
of the banking system because on that date no money had yet changed hands and the 
government had no saying on how this capital were to be used. 
Of course, having a prior relationship with one ( or more) of these nine banks that 
were named at the TARP announcement brings in additional gains for the borrower, as 
attested by the positive coefficient on the 9-TARP dummy. 9-TARP is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value of 1 if the firm has an existing credit line with any one of the 
initial nine banks included in the first round of TARP. The magnitude of the coefficient 
in column 3, 1.8%, is substantial considering that some of these benefits are already 
accounted for by the LEAD BANK TIER 1 CAP. RATIO variable. The situation here 
echoes the positive stock price response to Continental Illinois's borrowers when it got 
bailed out (Slavin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993)), and is direct evidence of the value 
of banking relationships. Let's assume for a moment that the previously demonstrated 
differences in returns were caused by some unknown economic factor unrelated to banking. 
There would be no reason for the firms who had borrowed from the nine TARP banks 
to outperform those who had not, if they did not stand to benefit from the government 
bailout through the bank lending channel. 
Bank solvency (proxied by the capital ratio) is not the only measure of banks' ability 
and willingness to lend. Bank liquidity is also an important dimension. I proxy for liquid-
13Consider this real-world example: on the· day of the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, an unrated firm 
whose main lender was Wachovia with a capital ratio of 7.8%, would have returned approximately 
0.36% less than another firm whose main lender was Bank of America, whose capital ratio was 9.4%. 
And that same firm who had borrowed from Wachovia would have appreciated an extra 0.51 % in 
response to the TARP announcement, compared to a borrower from Bank of America. 
20 
ity by the bank's core deposits. Deposits are a stable source of funding for banks because 
of the explicit guarantees offered by the FDIC. Thus, one expects banks whose deposits 
make up a larger fraction of their assets to be more willing to lend. The coefficient on 
LEAD BANK DEPOSITS is positive and significant on the day of Lehman's bankruptcy, 
supporting this view. Firms whose relationship banks had easier access to cash through 
deposits are viewed more favorable by the market in a crisis. 
By the second half of 2008 it has become apparent to investors that subprime mort-
gages were the main culprit for the crisis, and in particular for bank failures. Yet another 
way to proxy for banks' financial health therefore, is to look at their mortgage exposure. 
LEAD BANK MORTGAGE is the value of residential mortgages as a fraction of total 
assets on the bank's balance sheet at the end of 2007. Higher mortgage exposure is the 
forerunner of future losses due to defaults, hence implies a weaker bank. Not surprisingly, 
this variable turns out to be negatively related to the borrower's stock return. Its eco-
nomic significance is comparable to the effects of bank capital on borrower performance. 
One standard deviation increase in mortgage exposure reduces the borrower's returns by 
0.53% on the day of Lehman's bankruptcy, and boosts returns by a similar amount on 
the news of the bailout. One caveat is that these estimates may not accurately reflect 
the true impact of mortgages, as it was common practice among banks to move mortgage 
products off their balance sheets. 
Moving onto loan characteristics we see that they are all significant to some extent. 
LOAN SPREAD which controls for the creditworthiness of the borrower is significant 
at the 1 % level in both panels. It could be said that the underperformance of unrated 
firms is a reflection of their credit quality, however with the LOAN SPREAD to proxy for 
credit quality UNRATED is more likely to be capturing bank-dependence. LENGTH of 
RELATIONSHIP which is measured in years, is significant at the 5% level but note that 
magnitude of this coefficient is quite small. It may take many years working with the 
same bank to observe an economically significant benefit. This is one reason why bank 
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failures, by the nontransferable nature of relationships, impose deadweight costs. Lastly, 
TOTAL LINES and NUMBER of PARTICIPANTS are significant at the 5% and 10% 
level. In the next section I will show that this result is driven primarily by unrated firms, 
hence I defer their discussion till then. 
Overall, the results in this section underscore the influence of bank health and dura-
bility on the whole economy. My findings complement the "borrowers as stakeholders" 
concept put forth in Slavin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), by showing that the stake-
holder view applies more generally than initially assumed. Failure of major banks, or 
their rescue, affects all firms. Every firm that requires bank credit becomes a stakeholder 
in every bank. 
4.3 Interactions 
The previous section assumed that the explanatory variables did not vary in their 
degree of significance with the credit rating of the firm. I relax that assumption in this 
section and repeat my tests within each rating category. Columns 1 to 3 in the two panels 
of Table 5 correspond to the rating categories previously marked by the dummy variables. 
The regression model is estimated as a system of equations to facilitate tests of equality 
of the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by the rating category. 
[Table 5 here] 
The first takeaway from Table 5 is that the estimated coefficients for individual rating 
groups are unequal. The Wald test for the equality of all three models rejects at 1 % 
(p-value in Panel A is zero to four significant digits). The differences in the estimated 
coefficients are easily discernible by casual observation. For the investment grade rated 
group, variables which previously exhibited significance are not at all significant. This is 
consistent with the initial assumption that access to public debt markets makes these firms 
essentially non-bank-dependent. For the junk rated and unrated group, the coefficients 
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are typically larger than their counterparts in Table 4. For example, LEAD BANK TIER 
1 CAP. RATIO and LEAD BANK MORTGAGE are more strongly related to returns for 
junk rated firms compared to the average firm. 
Compared to the regression results in Table 4, TOTAL LINES and NUMBER of 
PARTICIPANTS display stronger significance (t=-3.31 and t=3.26) among unrated firms. 
NUMBER of PARTICIPANTS measures how dispersed the loan is, and it is easy to see 
why having access to more than one bank in a crisis would be beneficial: syndication of 
the loan provide a sort of diversification benefit to borrowers. The negative coefficient 
on TOTAL LINES may not be immediately intuitive and requires a bit of explanation. 
If credit lines are a form of liquidity insurance, firms with more lines are supposed to be 
better shielded from liquidity shocks. However, this reasoning assumes that banks will 
always be ready to lend. The unique aspect of this financial crisis was that the liquidity 
issues emerged from the banks themselves, which made them even more hesitant to lend. 
Even if banks were willing to lend, Lehman Brothers' sudden bankruptcy made it seem 
like any bank could fail overnight. The market's concern about bank durability over this 
period is likely to have decreased the perceived insurance value of credit lines, giving rise 
to a negative relation between the amount of lines and returns. 
4.4 Tests on other days 
4.4.1 "Good" news and "Bad" news 
In this section, I investigate the stock market responses to a wider selection of banking 
related events that occurred in the last half of 2008. I focus on the period after Lehman's 
collapse, because it happens to be extraordinarily rich in terms of banks' failures and 
policy responses. First, I select the banking-related events from the timeline on St. Louis 
Fed's website and classify them as 11good 11 or 11bad 11 based on the return of the Dow Jones 
US Financial Services Index. A positive return implies optimism about the future of the 
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banking industry (hence "good"), a negative return implies pessimism (hence "bad"). A 
priori, I expect these sentiments to migrate to non-financial firms, as was the case for 
Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, and the TARP bailout. Figure 2 shows the timeline of the 
selected events. Events in the upper half of the graph represent the "good" news, events 
in the lower half, the II bad II news. 
{Figure 2 here} 
{Table 6 here} 
Table 6 presents the cross-sectional regression results. The dependent variable is the 
daily abnormal return of a firm averaged over the II good 11, or the II bad 11, event days. 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the TARP announcement are excluded from this analy-
sis to avoid these two major events driving the results (their inclusion makes the results 
reported in this section stronger). The two main variables of interest, "JUNK" RATED 
and UNRATED, are significant on both "bad" and "good" news days, in almost all spec-
ifications. The signs are consistent with what we have observed before. The magnitudes 
of the coefficients are somewhat smaller, due to the fact that some of these events may 
have been anticipated or the banks being less interconnected than Lehman. This may 
also be the reason why bank characteristics do not turn out to be significant in this set of 
regressions. The underperformance of non-investment grade firms on "bad II news days, 
and their overperformance on "good" news days supports the same conclusion reached 
earlier: firms that rely on bank credit have a valuable stake in the durability of the banking 
system. 
4.4.2 Non-event days 
The US stock market went through one of its most volatile periods in recent history 
during the financial crisis of 2008. Daily index fluctuations of 1-2% were not uncommon, 
so it is conceivable that the daily return differences documented in this paper are driven by 
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the heightened volatility. It could also be the case that these differences always existed, 
and do not necessarily reflect the reaction to the banking events. To rule out these 
explanations, I try two different estimation techniques. First, I run the same cross-
sectional regressions on the same set of firms from DealScan, on every trading day in 
2008. I save the estimated coefficients and compare the coefficients I previously obtained 
on the event days to this II empirical II distribution ( the methodology resembles partly the 
Fama-MacBeth approach, and partly bootstrapping, but is not exactly either one). I also 
repeat this exercise for all firms in Compustat, going further back in time to a pre-crisis 
period 14 . Second, I run one panel regression in 2008, interacting the event dummies with 
firm, bank, and loan characteristics. The aim is to show that these characteristics are not 
significant on an average day, but become significant on specific dates. 
{Table 1 here} 
Table 7 reports the time-series summary statistics of the saved coefficients, the point 
estimates previously reported on the day of Lehman's bankruptcy and the TARP an-
nouncement, and their corresponding non-parametric p-values calculated from the em-
pirical distribution. In Panel A, p-value of the coefficient on UNRATED observed on 
September 15, 2008 (Lehman Brothers bankruptcy) is 0.036, which means that only on 
9 days out of the 253 trading days were the estimated coefficients greater in magnitude 
than the value observed on September 15. In other words, there were only 9 days in 2008 
when the performance of unrated firms relative to investment grade firms was worse than 
the time around Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. Similarly, junk rated firms' relative per-
formance was worse only on 13 days (p=0.051). P-values for LEAD BANK MORTGAGE 
and LEAD BANK TIER 1 CAP. RATIO are lower (0.016 and 0.024, respectively). In 
Panel B, I run the same tests for the Compustat sample in 2008. The p-values are 0.020 
14 The DealScan sample is not useful before 2008 for this methodogy becase the borrower-lender 
matching is done in 2006-2007 
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for UNRATED and 0.059 for "JUNK" RATED. LEVERAGE and EBITDA also exhibit 
p-values below 5%. Overall, there is not much evidence to warrant volatility as the driving 
factor behind abnormal returns. 
In Panel C, I report results obtained in the pre-crisis period, 2005-2007, using the 
Compustat sample. The empirical p-values for both "JUNK" RATED and UNRATED 
turn out to be identically zero in these tests. It is possible that on some days one ( or 
both) of these groups of firms may have underperformed investment grade firms, but 
there does not exist a single day in 2005, 2006, or 2007 where that difference exceeds 
what was observed on the day of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. These tests demonstrate 
that non-investment grade firms do not consistently underperform investment grade firms; 
hence we can rule out the explanation that the abnormal returns represent some sort of 
asset-pricing anomaly. 
{Table 8 here} 
Table 8 presents pooled OLS regressions using the DealScan sample in 2008. The 
dependent variable is the daily abnormal return and the same set of explanatory variables 
are used (only selected variables are displayed to save space). Standard errors are clus-
tered by day. Interaction terms are included as three separate sets to avoid collinearity 
issues. As expected, the variables which were successful in explaining the cross-section of 
returns on specific event days are not significant when all trading days are included in the 
regressions. Interaction terms with the event dates on the other hand, are. Roughly speak-
ing Columns 1 represent the importance of having access to capital markets , Columns 
2 represent the relative ease of obtaining new bank loans, and Columns 3 represent the 
financial conditions of the lender, all of which become important for valuations when there 
is a shock to the banking industry. 
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4.5 Robustness 
All regressions thus far were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). While 
they all included industry dummies, I employ two additional methods in this section 
to control for industry-level heteroskedasticity and demonstrate the robustness of the 
results. In Table 8 columns named "Clustered Std. Errors" represent OLS regressions 
with standard errors clustered at the Fama-French 12 industry level. Columns named 
"Weighted Least Squares II report a 2-stage generalized least squares ( GLS) estimation, in 
which the first stage uses the regression residuals to estimate industry variances, and the 
second weights the observations by the reciprocal of those industry variances. Because 
GLS is more efficient than standard OLS theoretically, I expect more precise estimates 
with this approach (assuming the specifications are valid). 
[ Table 9 here] 
The results in Table 9 confirm these expectations. T-statistics for "JUNK" RATED 
and UNRATED are larger than the ones found in Table 4. To illustrate, on the day of 
Lehman's bankruptcy the coefficient on UNRATED in Column 2 obtained using weighted 
least squares has a t-statistic of -5.14, whereas the same coefficient obtained using OLS 
has a t-statistic of -3.17. For the same variable on the TARP date, the weighted least 
squares returns a t-statistic of 2.29 whereas OLS returns 1.06. T-statistics of other vari-
ables of interest, such as EBITDA, LENGTH of RELATIONSHIP, 9-TARP, TOTAL 
LINES, among others, resemble previous findings and are higher in some cases. TOTAL 
LINES for example, goes from being significant at the 5% level to 1 % when estimated 
by weighted least squares as opposed to ordinary least squares. Statistical significance 
aside, clustered standard errors vs. weighted least squares yield remarkably close point 
estimates, reaffirming that the regressions are properly specified. For example, the coeffi-
cients on UNRATED are -2.096 and-2.286, 9-TARP are -1.973 and-1.851, and NUMBER 
of PARTICIPANTS are identical at 0.047. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper I examine the value of banking relationships by observing changes in 
the market valuations of non-financial firms with varying degrees of bank dependence, 
bank quality, and credit usage. The financial crisis of 2008 is an ideal opportunity to 
observe these changes because the subprime mortgages that gave rise- to the crisis were 
not associated with business lending or the non-financial firms' performance. This allows 
me to treat banking related events in the crisis such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
as exogenous shocks. I expect changes in bank durability to be reflected in the stock 
prices of non-financial firms if these firms cannot costlessly replace bank financing. 
Even though in a perfect capital market the type of financing should not affect firm 
value, theory has emphasized the banks' unique ability to reduce financial frictions such 
as information asymmetry and moral hazard, and thus create value. My findings support 
this view, and in addition suggest that the value of banking relationships is not strictly 
limited to small firms, or to the bank's pre-existing clients. I find that generally, more 
bank-dependent firms were hurt more by Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, and were helped 
more by the government bailouts. 
Banks' financial health also plays a role in the market valuations of their borrowers in 
periods of market turmoil. The more deeply invested in mortgages and less adequately 
capitalized a bank was, the lower were the stock returns of its borrowers at the time of 
Lehman's collapse, and higher at the announcement of the TARP capital injections. If the 
borrower has an investment grade rating, they seem immune to the financial conditions 
at their banks, presumably as a result of their ability to substitute bonds or commercial 
paper for bank credit. The Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's remark, "money was easy for 
a few safe borrowers, but difficult for everyone else" 15 , regarding the great depression is 
equally apt for the current crisis. 
15It is possible to draw more parallels between the Great Depression and the current financial crisis. 
See Bernanke (1983) for a detailed discussion. 
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Particularly among unrated firms - the group who is the most bank-dependent -
higher levels of bank lines of credit contracted on before the crisis led, curiously, to lower 
stock performance at the time of the crisis. This result implies that credit lines may only 
provide a firm liquidity insurance if the banks themselves are not liquidity constrained, or 
insolvent. The syndication of these lines benefits the firm. Greater the number of banks 
that participate in a deal, higher was the firm's stock return. 
Using the TARP funds to inject capital directly into the banks appears to have benefit-
ted not only Wall Street, but also Main Street, as evidenced by the positive stock returns 
experienced by the more bank-dependent firms. Nevertheless, I shy away from making 
specific policy recommendations based on these findings. For some, empirical evidence 
demonstrating the interconnectedness of the banking industry and the spillover effects to 
outside industries provide justification for the government bailouts. For others, the same 
results call for a overhaul of the regulatory system and an effort to end "too big to fail". 
Hopefully, this paper can aid such discussions with its analysis of the current events. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON PUBLIC FIRMS IN COMPUSTAT 
Dataset includes public firms in the Compustat annual files in 2007 whose balance sheets record nonzero long-term debt, or debt in current 
liabilities, and whose stock returns are available on September 15th, 2008. Firms in the financial, real estate, insurance, and construction sectors 
are excluded. Compustat variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. BID-ASK is the ask price minus the bid price on the event date, divided by 
the average share price over the previous three months (excluding the event date). SIZE is the market value of equity on the last day of 2007. 
BOOK-TO-MARKET is book value divided by market value of equity. Book value is the stockholders' book equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit, minus the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) of preferred stock. If stockholders' equity is missing I 
substitute in the book value of common equity plus the par value of preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in that order). 
DIVIDEND YIELD is the total common/ordinary dividends divided by market value of equity. CASH is Compustat item Cash and Short-Term 
Investments, EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, LEVERAGE is Long-Term Debt plus Debt in Current Liabilities, PP&E is Property, Plant and 
Equipment, all normalized by total assets. 
Borrower characteristics 





CASH EBITDA LEVERAGE PP&E 
Panel A: Investment Grade Rated Firms 
Mean 0.255 24043 0.518 0.019 o.on 0.147 0.246 0.337 
Median 0.100 8955 0.413 0.014 0.046 0.138 0.243 0.263 
Std. Dev. 1.012 47061 0.409 0.031 0.Q76 0.065 0.126 0.232 
Obs 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 
Panel B: Speculative ("Junk") Grade Rated Firms 
Mean 0.423 2924 1.319 0.038 0.087 0.125 0.419 0.347 
Median 0.161 1434 0.577 0.000 0.049 0.118 0.370 0.297 
Std. Dev. 1.176 4685 8.683 0.375 0.112 0.072 0.323 0.252 
Obs 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 
Panel C: Unrated Firms 
Mean 1.865 848 1.183 0.034 0.227 0.017 0.217 0.232 
Median 0.439 247 0.469 0.000 0.124 0.089 0.154 0.144 
Std. Dev. 3.363 2836 8.003 0.452 0.250 0.240 0.277 0.232 
Obs 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 
TABLE 2: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS OF ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS ON FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
IN COMPUSTAT 
The dependent variable is the firm's abnormal stock return on the event date. Abnormal return is 
the realized return minus the expected return according to the Fama-French three-factor model. Model 
parameters are estimated from daily returns in 2007 at the firm level. In Panel A, the event date is 
September 15, 2008, the day on which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. In Panel B, the event date 
is October 14, 2008, the day on which the Treasury announced the capital injections into the nine largest 
US banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Balance sheet items and S&P credit ratings 
are measured at the end of the company's fiscal year in 2007. Compustat variables are winsorized at 1 % 
and 99%. "JUNK" RATED is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the firm has a S&P long-term debt 
rating that is equal to BB+ or below, 0 otherwise. UNRATED is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if 
the firm has no S&P long-term debt rating, 0 otherwise. Investment-grade rating is the omitted category. 
COVENANT VIOLATE is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the firm has a covenant violation 
reported in the SEC filings in 2007 or in 2008, before Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. Firms with no debt 
are excluded from the sample, as well as firms in the financial, real estate, insurance, and construction 
sectors. In column 4 of both panels firms smaller than the smallest investment grade rated firm (measured 
by market value of equity) are dropped. All specifications include (but do not report) industry dummies 
using Fama-French 12 industry definitions. T-statistics based on OLS standard errors are in parentheses. 
Panel A: Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Panel B: TARP - 9 BANKS announcement 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
Size> $391M Size> $391M 
BID-ASK 0.125 0.100 0.110 -0.158 -0.063 -0.048 -0.039 -0.896 
(2.75)*** (2.17)" (2.39)** (-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.74) (-0.59) (-2 43)" 
logSIZE 0.318 0.123 0.107 -0.411 -0.227 -0.020 -0 036 0.111 
(4.60)*** (1.36) (118) (-3.57)*** (-2.06)** (-0.14) (-0.25) (0 71) 
BOOK-TO-MARKET 0.019 0.018 0.018 -0.267 0.012 0.013 0.014 -0.189 
(1.30) (118) (1.24) (-2.37)** (0.49) (0.55) (0.58) (-1.23) 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.076 0.069 0.101 0.792 -0.650 -0.629 -0.596 -4.552 
(0.27) (025) (0.36) (0.76) (-149) (-1.44) (-1.36) (-3.25)*** 
CASH 0.146 0.538 0.320 0.174 -0.023 -0.495 -0.710 -0.223 
(0.21) (0.78) (0.46) (0.21) (-0.02) (-0.45) (-0.65) (-0.20) 
EBITDA 2.985 3.256 3.220 6.027 -6.147 -6.388 -6.425 -5.694 
(4.16)*** (4.52)*** (4.47)*** (5.25)*** (-5.39)*** (-5.58)*** (-5.61)*" (-3.65)*** 
LEVERAGE -1.210 -1.312 -1.306 -1.476 0.198 0.510 0.512 1.784 
(-2.90)*** (-3.06)'" (-3.04)'** (-3.22)*** (0.30) (0 74) (0.74) (2.88)*'* 
PP&E -0.389 -0.390 -0.411 0.241 0.030 0.097 0.085 -0.764 
(-062) (-0.62) (-0.66) (038) (0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (-0.88) 
"JUNK" RATED -0868 -0.861 -1.621 0.185 0.193 0.531 
(-1.96)'* (-1 95)* (-4.35)*** (027) (028) (1 05) 
UNRATED -1.514 -1.490 -2.157 1.460 1.482 1.689 
(-3.30)*** (-325)*** (-5.44)'** (2 03)'* (206)** (3.15)*** 
COVENANT VIOLATE -0.833 -1.147 -0.826 -0.220 
(-2.24)** (-2.39)** (-1.41) (-0.34) 
Observations 2561 2561 2561 1448 2540 2540 2540 1443 




TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON BORROWERS, LENDERS, AND LOANS IN DEALSCAN 
Dataset is built from all public firms in the 2006 and 2007 version of DealScan, for whom balance sheet information exists in Compustat as 
of 2007, and whose stock returns are available on September 15th, 2008. Among those, only the firms whose lead banks (lead arranger, bookrunner, 
etc.) in the loan deals are commercial banks or bank holding companies that can be matched to the FDIC Call Reports at the end of 2007 are 
used. Borrowers in the financial, real estate, insurance, construction, and utilities sectors are excluded. Deals in which Lehman Brothers is recorded 
as a lead bank are excluded. Only credit line deals are used in the sample, which are identified by the "loan type" variable indicating "Revolver", 
"Line", or "364-Day Facility". LEAD BANK TIER 1 CAP. RATIO is data item Tier 1 Capital divided by the Risk-Weighted Assets, LEAD BANK 
DEPOSITS is data item Total Deposits minus Wholesale Deposits divided by Total Assets, LEAD BANK MORTGAGE is data item Mortgages 
Secured by 1-4 Family Residential Mortgages divided by Total Assets, in the Call Report. LENGTH of RELATIONSHIP is the time in years between 
the first deal and the last deal that can be found in DealScan for a given borrower-lender pair. LOAN SPREAD is the interest rate in basis points 
that a borrower needs to pay over LIBOR when he or she draws on the line. TOTAL LINES is the sum of all loan facility dollar amounts for a given 
firm, divided by the total assets of the firm. NUMBER of PARTICIPANTS is the total number of lenders in a syndicated loan deal. If multiple 
facilities exist for a single borrower all lender and deal characteristics are weighted by the relative size of the facility. 
Bcxrower characteristics Lender characteristics Deal characteristics 
BOOK-TO 
LEAD BANK 
DMDEND LEAD BANK LEAD BANK LENGTH of NUMBER of 
Statistie BID-ASK SIZE($M) CASH EBITDA LEVERAGE PP&E TIER 1 CAP. LOAN SPREAD TOTAL LINES -MARKET YIELD DEPOSITS MORTGAGE RELATIONSHIP PARTICIPANTS 
RATIO 
Panel A: Investment Grade Rated Firms 
Mean 0277 25047 0.504 0.019 0.069 0.149 0.246 0.325 0.081 0.423 0145 9.511 32.792 0163 12083 
Medan 0100 9713 0 397 0013 0047 0.140 0.239 0.255 0.090 0452 0113 9.546 28.000 0.151 11.000 
Std. Dev. 1.165 46553 0.391 O.Q35 0076 0.065 0.125 0.225 0.025 0.145 0.077 6.210 24.110 0.125 6.267 
Obs 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
Panel B: Speculative ("Junk") Grade Rated Firms 
Mean 0.370 2819 1 015 0.026 0.071 0.123 0.416 0335 o 076 0390 0.150 5.707 148.094 0.224 9.364 
Medan 0.148 1545 0.572 0.000 0037 0.116 0.367 0.273 0.088 0452 0.135 4.564 150 000 0.159 7.083 
std. Dev. 0813 3759 3552 0166 0.084 0.065 0.378 0.252 0.031 0174 0090 5456 73.851 0.215 7.073 
Obs 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 
Panel C: Unrated Firms 
Mean 1l809 1649 0973 0050 0.091 0.124 0.243 0.262 0080 0.449 0.184 3.456 116.875 0.356 6.264 
Medan 0.199 708 0.507 0.000 0045 0.127 0.213 0.181 0.086 0.452 0.231 1.333 100.000 0.264 6.000 
Std. Dev. 2.018 4101 3.117 0.468 0114 0.102 0.260 0.235 0.021 0.146 0.085 4530 87760 0.440 4604 
Obs 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
TABLE 4: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS OF ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS ON FIRM, BANK, AND LOAN 
CHARACTERISTICS IN DEALSCAN 
The dependent variable is the firm's abnormal stock return on the event date. In Panel A, the 
event date is September 15, 2008, in Panel B, October 14, 2008. Balance sheet items and S&P credit ratings 
are measured at the end of the company's fiscal year in 2007. Bank characteristics are taken from the Call 
Report at the end of 2007. 9-BANK is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the lead bank in a deal 
was one of the initial 9 banks which agreed to receive capital under the TARP, 0 otherwise. See Tables 
1-3 for the other variable definitions. Standardized coefficients are reported for LEAD BANK DEPOSITS, 
LEAD BANK MORTGAGE, and LEAD BANK TIER 1 CAP. RATIO. Firms with no debt are excluded 
from the sample, as well as firms in the financial, real estate, insurance, and construction industries. All 
specifications include (but do not report) industry dummies using Fama-French 12 industry definitions. 
T-statistics based on OLS standard errors are in parentheses. 
Panel A: Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Panel B: TARP - 9 BANKS announcement 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Size> $391M Size> $391M 
BID-ASK -0.065 -0.017 0.020 -0.232 -0.595 -0.660 -0.679 -0.617 
(-0.68) (-0.18) (0.20) (-1.29) (-4.29)' .. (-4.74)'" (-4.87)'" (-1.33) 
logSIZE -0.197 -0.456 -0.436 -0.409 -0.020 0.291 0.277 0.270 
(-1.68)' (-3.40)'" (-3.25)'" (-2.59)'" (-0.10) (1.25) (119) (118) 
BOOK-TO-MARKET 0.051 0.039 0044 0.153 -0.046 -0.023 -0031 -0.392 
(1.03) (0.80) (0.90) (0.96) (-0.54) (-0.28) (-0.36) (-1.63) 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.412 0.382 0.379 -0.245 -2.481 -2420 -2401 -4.374 
(0.95) (0.89) (0.89) (-0.24) (-3 35)'" (-3.28)'" (-3.26)'" (-2.96)'" 
CASH 1.203 1.622 1.810 1.663 0.967 0.405 0.275 -0496 
(0.77) (1.04) (1.16) (1.00) (0.37) (0.15) (0.10) (-0.21) 
EBITDA 8.198 7.303 7.237 6.279 -4.518 -2.542 -2.705 -4.380 
(4.62)'" (4.12)' .. (4.08)' .. (2.93)" .. (-149) (-0.83) (-0.89) (-1.39) 
LEVERAGE -1.794 -1.512 -1.476 -1.448 1.932 1.584 1.401 2.028 
(-3.48)"' (-2.93)"" (-2.85)'" (-2.77)""' (2.20)" (1.78)' (1.57) (2.66)' .. 
PP&E -0.150 -0.262 -0.252 0.034 -0.249 -0.034 -0 083 -1.228 
(-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.34) (0.04) (-0.19) (-0.03) (-0.06) (-1.04) 
'~UNK" RATED -1.454 -0.881 -0.926 -0.919 -0.104 -0.973 -0.997 -0.247 
(-3.42)' .. (-1.97)" (-2.08)" (-1.98)" (-0.14) (-1.27) (-1.30) (-0.36) 
UNRATED -1.448 -0.967 -1.013 -1.275 0.821 0.396 0.414 0 921 
(-3.17)'" (-2.10)" (-2.20)" (-2.77)'" (1.06) (0.50) (0.52) (1.37) 
COVENANT VIOLATE -1187 -1.072 -1 090 -1.270 -0.631 -0.856 -0.895 -0.519 
(-2.56)" (-2.33) .. (-2.38)" (-2.35)" (-0.80) (-1.08) (-1.13) (-0.66) 
LEAD BANK 0.433 0.056 
DEPOSITS (2 30)" (0.17) 
LEAD BANK -0.529 -0.532 -0.409 0.074 0.529 0.033 
MORTGAGE (-2.77)'" (-2.91)'" (-2.04)" (0.23) (1.68)' (0.11) 
LEAD BANK 0.483 0.358 -0.669 -0.351 
TIER 1 CAP. RATIO (2.56)" (1.80)' (-2.07)" (-1.21) 
LENGTH of 0.065 0.060 0.048 -0.047 -0.029 -0.040 
RELATIONSHIP (2.53)" (2.32)" (1.87)' (-1.06) (-0.65) (-1.06) 
LOAN SPREAD -0007 -0007 -0.007 0.013 0.012 0.007 
(-3.05)'" (-2.92)' .. (-2.53)" (3.32)'" (3.22)"' (1.65)' 
TOTAL LINES -1 052 -0.991 0.582 0.578 0.511 0.154 
(-2.32)" (-2.18)" (0.76) (0.74) (0.65) (0.14) 
NUMBER of 0.043 0.043 0.030 -0036 -0 045 -0.048 
PARTICIPANTS (1.73)' (1.73)' (1.26) (-0.85) (-1.07) (-138) 
9-TARP -1.252 -1.824 -1.314 1.347 2.054 0.807 
(-3.05)'" (-3 98)'" (-2.50)" (1.89)' (2.61 )' .. (1.05) 
Observations 880 880 880 719 874 874 874 715 
R-squared 0.186 0.223 0.224 0.224 0.084 0.103 0.107 0.127 
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TABLE 5: REGRESSIONS WITHIN CREDIT RATING CATEGORIES 
This table reports the cross-sectional regressions of abnormal stock returns of borrowers in DealScan 
on firm, bank, and loan characteristics, run separately within each credit rating category (i.e., investment-
grade, speculative-grade, unrated), on the two event dates: Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy and the TARP 
announcement. The dependent variable is the firm's abnormal stock return on the event date. See Tables 
1-4 for the variable definitions. The models are estimated as a system of equations and standard errors are 
clustered by the ratings category. All specifications include (but do not report) industry dummies using 
Fama-French 12 industry definitions. Chi-squared statistic and the corresponding p--value is obtained from 
the Wald test that jointly tests the equality of coefficients across the three models. 
Panel A· Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Panel B TARP- 9 BANKS announcement 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Variables INVESTMENT SPECULATIVE UNRATED INVESTMENT SPECULATIVE UNRATED 
GRADE RATED GRADE RATED GRADE RATED GRADE RATED 
BID-ASK -0.207 -0.496 0.201 -1.548 0.431 -0.822 
(-4 48)"' (-1.49) (170)' (-1.92)' (0.61) (-1.69)' 
logSIZE -0.089 -0.771 -0.579 -0.240 1.086 0.156 
(-0.41) (-2.72)'" (-2.18)" (-0.97) (2.08)" (0.29) 
BOOK-TO-MARKET -0.388 0.034 0.042 -1.111 0.017 0011 
(-0.49) (1.09) (1.32) (-1.42) (0.28) (0.11) 
DIVIDEND YIELD 4.741 -0.636 0.398 -2.737 1.928 -2.647 
(1.65)' (-0.34) (2.69)"' (-0.51) (1.13) (-3.39)'" 
CASH -5.262 10.973 1.483 2.827 -1.197 -0.784 
(-1 66)' (3.39)'" (0.66) (0 82) (-0.18) (-0.22) 
EBITDA 2.708 8.931 9 096 -6 814 -1.647 -4.236 
(0.73) (2.70)'" (3 78)'" (-1.69)' (-0.25) (-108) 
LEVERAGE 2.231 -2.946 1039 3.746 4.137 -4.009 
(1.27) (-6.99)"' (1.59) (178)' (2.85)"' (-178)' 
PP&E -0.236 -0.308 0 059 0.853 -0.886 1.316 
(-0 22) (-0.20) (0.05) (0.56) (-0 32) (0.51) 
COVENANT VIOLATE 0.635 -1.690 -1.209 -2.409 1.653 -1837 
(0.65) (-1.63) (-1.59) (-1.90)' (1.09) (-1.21) 
LEAD BANK -0.389 -0.720 -0.557 -0083 1.298 0.537 
MORTGAGE (-1.53) (-2.09)" (-1.91)' (-0.27) (1.77)' (106) 
LEAD BANK -0.052 0.801 0.544 -0 025 -1981 -0006 
TIER 1 CAP. RATIO (-0.23) (2.09)" (1.93)' (-0 10) (-2.47)" (-0.01) 
LENGTH cl 0.011 0.129 0.032 0.019 -0027 -0075 
RELATIONSHIP (0.42) (2.56)" (0.65) (0.59) (-0.30) (-0.78) 
LOAN SPREAD -0.001 -0.008 -0 005 -0003 0 014 0.011 
(-0.13) (-1.75)' (-1.59) (-0 42) (1.95)' (190)' 
TOTAL LINES -2 237 0.977 -1 594 -0.485 0.002 0.984 
(-125) (0.99) (-3.31)'" (-0.27) (0.00) (0.90) 
NUMBER cl 0.008 0.016 0.162 -0011 -0.032 -0 143 
PARTICIPANTS (0.27) (0.45) (3.26)'" (-0.34) (-0.53) (-154) 
9-TARP -0.768 -3.012 -1.782 0.851 3141 1829 
(-0.98) (-3.04)'" (-2.64)'" (0.76) (170)' (1.49) 
Observations 283 251 346 281 250 343 
R-squared 0.205 0.333 0.256 0.165 0.190 0.174 
Wald test: Model 1=Model 2=Model 3 164.9 164.9 164.9 81.87 81.87 81.87 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0051 0.0051 0.0051 
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TABLE 6: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS OF AVERAGE ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS ON DAYS WITH 
BANKING-RELATED NEWS EVENTS 
The dependent variable 1s the abnormal return of a borrower, averaged across days which are classi-
fied as either good news or bad news events. The events are taken from the financial crisis timeline on St. 
Louis Fed's website and the list is given in Figure 2. "Bad News Days" and "Good News Days" are defined 
by the daily return of the Dow Jones US Financial Services Index being negative, or positive, respectively, 
on the day of the event. Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy and the TARP announcement are excluded from 
the list of events. In Column 1 of each panel Compustat sample is used, in remaining columns DealScan 









































































































































































































































































































TABLE 7: EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
This table reports the time-series summary statistics of the cross-sectional regression coefficients, estimated and recorded on every trading 
day in the 2005-2008 period. The dependent variable is the firm's daily abnormal return. See Tables 1-4 for the variable definitions. Panel A reports 
results for the DealScan sample in 2008, Panel B reports results for the Compustat sample in 2008, Panel C reports results for the Compustat sample 
from 2005 through 2007. P-values corresponding to the two events (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy and the TARP announcement) are non-parametric 
estimates derived from the empirical distribution in each panel. 
Panel A: Dea!Scan firms in 2008 
COEFF.on P-VAWE on COEFF.on P-VAWE on 
MEAN STD. DEV. 
1th 99th TARP- 9 BANKS Variables LEHMAN BROS. LEHMAN BROS. TARP - 9 BANKS PERCENTILE PERCENTILE 
BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY ANNOUCEMENT ANNOUCEMENT 
BID-ASK 0.069 0.364 -0.775 1.023 0.020 0.458 -0.679 0.012 
logSIZE 0.045 0.262 -0.642 0.798 -0.436 0.032 0.277 0.146 
BOOK-TO-MARKET -0.003 0.115 -0.391 0.406 0.044 0.241 -0.031 0.368 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.023 0.909 -2.393 3.123 0.379 0.237 -2.401 0.008 
CASH 0.017 1.916 -5.064 4.790 1.810 0.162 0.275 0.427 
EBITDA 0.502 3.562 -9.214 8.427 7.237 0.032 -2.705 0.126 
LEVERAGE -0.164 1.069 -2.731 2.516 -1.476 0.079 1.401 0.071 
PP&E 0.026 1.010 -2.658 2.651 -0.252 0.372 -0.083 0.439 
"JUNK'' RATED 0.030 0.699 -1.893 2.582 -0.926 0.051 -0.997 0.047 
UNRATED 0.048 0.675 -1.591 2.683 -1.013 0.036 0.414 0.202 
COVENANT VIOLATE -0.075 0.620 -1.558 1.801 -1.090 0.055 -0.895 0.075 
LEAD BANK MORTGAGE -0.006 0.204 -0.572 0.637 -0.532 0.016 0.529 0.016 
LEAD BANK TIER 1 CAP. RATIO 0.015 0.224 -0.834 0.547 0.483 0.024 -0.669 0.012 
LENGTH of RELATIONSHIP 0.000 0.029 -0.077 0.070 0.060 0.032 -0.029 0.126 
LOAN SPREAD -0.084 1.774 -4.396 4.513 -0.007 0.462 0.012 0.451 
TOTAL LINES 0.066 0.741 -1.940 2.665 -0.991 0.063 0.511 0.233 
NUMBER d PARTICIPANTS 0.001 0.026 -0.055 0.067 0.043 0.055 -0.045 0.040 
9-BANK -0.082 0.706 -2.101 1.949 -1.824 0.028 2.054 0.008 
Panel B: Compustat firms in 2008 





LEHMAN BROS. LEHMAN BROS. TARP - 9 BANKS TARP - 9 BANKS 
PERCENTILE 
BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY ANNOUCEMENT ANNOUCEMENT 
BID-ASK 0.080 0.153 -0.249 0.546 0.110 0.364 -0.048 0.146 
logSIZE 0.075 0.228 -0.345 0.976 0.107 0.372 -0.020 0.328 
BOOK-TO-MARKET -0.001 0.034 -0.070 0.129 0.018 0.213 0.013 0.281 
DIVIDEND YIELD -0.033 0.367 -0.904 0.989 0.101 0.285 -0.629 0.055 
CASH 0.126 0.849 -2.143 2.400 0.320 0.379 -0.495 0.209 
EBITDA 0.204 1.874 -6.304 4.928 3.220 0.043 -6.388 0.008 
LEVERAGE -0.054 0.769 -1.790 2.457 -1.306 0.036 0.510 0.142 
PP&E -0.010 0.814 -1.741 2.588 -0.411 0.277 0.097 0.395 
"JUNK'' RATED 0.067 0.720 -1.696 2.869 -0.861 0.059 0.185 0.352 
UNRATED 0.106 0.847 -1.957 3.989 -1.490 0.020 0.185 0.352 
COVENANT VIOLATE -0.047 0.492 -1.315 1.097 -0.833 0.055 1.460 0.059 
.... 
0 ----- - ---
Panel C: Compustat firms in 2005-2007 
COEFF.on P-VALUEon COEFF.on P-VALUEon 
Variables MEAN STD. DEV. 
1th 99th 
LEHMAN BROS. LEHMAN BROS. TARP - 9 BANKS TARP - 9 BANKS 
PERCENTILE PERCENTILE 
BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY ANNOUCEMENT ANNOUCEMENT 
BID-ASK 0.078 0.207 -0.319 0.979 0.110 0.393 -0.039 0.267 
logSIZE 0.005 0.099 -0.188 0.306 0.107 0.114 -0.036 0.336 
BOOK-TO-MARKET 0.000 0.042 -0.094 0.121 0.018 0.245 0.014 0.292 
DIVIDEND YIELD -0.071 1.466 -3.641 4.218 0.101 0.439 -0.596 0.340 
CASH -0.004 0.610 -1.603 1.460 0.320 0.289 -0.710 0.117 
EBITDA 0.088 0.891 -2.069 2.170 3.220 0.000 -6.425 0.000 
LEVERAGE 0.008 0.402 -0.968 1.005 -1.306 0.003 0.512 0.093 
PP&E 0.023 0.408 -0.902 0.986 -0.411 0.138 0.085 0.431 
"JUNK'' RATED 0.016 0.214 -0.477 0.575 -0.861 0.000 0.193 0.179 
UNRATED 0.004 0.264 -0.538 0.659 -1.490 0.000 1.482 0.003 
COVENANT VIOLATE -0.058 0.253 -0.632 0.556 -0.833 0.004 -0.826 0.004 
TABLE 8: PANEL REGRESSIONS WITH EVENT DATE INTERACTIONS 
This table extends the DealScan dataset in Table 4 to every trading day in 2008, essentially forming 
a panel. Pooled OLS regressions are run where the dependent variable is the firm's daily abnormal stock 
return. Standard errors are clustered by time (day). Event days are represented by a dummy variable: In 
Panel A, EVENT is equal to 1 if the date of the observation is equal to September 15, 2008, 0 otherwise, 
in Panel B, EVENT is equal to 1 if the date of the observation is equal to October 14, 2008, 0 otherwise. 
Borrower characteristics from Compustat are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
Panel A Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Panel B TARP - 9 BANKS announcement 
Var,ables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
"JUNK" RATED 0.027 0025 0.025 0.014 0.024 0.024 
(0.59) (0.55) (0.55) (0.30) (0.54) (0.54) 
UNRATED 0.062 0 062 0.062 0.057 0.061 0.061 
(1.41) (1.39) (1.39) (1.28) (1.39) (1.39) 
COVENANT VIOLATE -0 052 -0046 -0052 -0 052 -0057 -0.052 
(-1.20) (-1.08) (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.30) (-1.20) 
LEAD BANK -0004 -0004 -0 003 -0004 -0004 -0.003 
MORTGAGE (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0 32) (-0.32) (-0.28) 
LEAD BANK 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 
TIER 1 CAP. RATIO (025) (0 25) (0.20) (025) (0.25) (0.34) 
LENGTH of 0.000 -0001 0000 0.000 0000 0.000 
RELATIONSHIP (-0.08) (-0.29) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.13) (-0.08) 
LOAN SPREAD 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
TOTAL LINES 0.053 0.059 0.053 0 053 0.050 0.053 
(1.15) (1.28) (1.15) (1.16) (1.04) (1.16) 
NUMBER of 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
PARTICIPANTS (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (035) 
9-TARP -0080 -0 080 -0080 -0080 -0 080 -0.085 
(-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.73)* 
"JUNK" RATEDxEVENT -0.484 2.644 
(-9.85)*** (54.76)*** 
UNRATEDxEVENT -0.183 0 999 
(-6 06)*** (29.33)*** 
COV. VIOLATExEVENT -1.339 1.375 
(-26.86)*** (25.30)*** 
LENGTH of 0.098 0.025 
RELATIONSHIPxEVENT (42.52)*** (10. 84)*** 
TOTAL LINESxEVENT -1.365 0.982 
(-28.00)*** (19.34)*** 
LEAD BANK -0.078 -0.137 
MORTGAGExEVENT (-7.04)*** (-9.87)*** 
LEAD BANK 0.174 -0.307 
TIER 1 CAP. RATIOxEVENT (15.01)*** (-24.11)*** 
9-TARPxEVENT -0.070 1.352 
(-224)** (42.72)*** 
Observations 191407 191407 191407 191407.000 191407 191407 
R-~uared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
41 
TABLE 9: INDUSTRY-CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS AND WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES 
This table reports the cross-sectional regressions of abnormal stock returns of borrowing firms in 
DealScan on firm, bank, and loan characteristics. Unlike previous regressions, industry dummies are not 
included. Industry-level heteroskedasticity 1s taken account of as following: Columns 1 and 3 cluster 
standard errors by industry, columns 2 and 4 utilize a 2-stage GLS methodology where observations are 






































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 1: INTERBANK LENDING CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS 
This figure shows the time-series of the daily TED spread from July 2008 to July 2009. TED spread is the difference between 3-month LI-
BOR and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, hence is an indicator of the willingness of the banks to lend to each other. Higher values imply higher risk 
of default. The two marked points refer to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the announcement of the capital injections under the TARP. The 
units are in percentage points. Source: Bloomberg 
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FIGURE 2: TIMELINE OF THE BANKING RELATED EVENTS IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 2008 
This figure reports the daily returns of the Dow Jones US Financial Services Index on event dates taken from the St. Louis Fed's web site 
on the financial crisis . 
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